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Abstract
This Comment considers the Northern Ireland Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC),
its establishment, and its likely effects on miscarriages of justice. Part I of this Comment considers
British and Northern Irish law. Part I also highlights British law leading up to the creation of the
CCRC and Northern Irish law in light of its unique elements. Part II explains the establishment
of the CCRC, its powers, and structure. Additionally, Part II discusses various commentary on
the creation of the CCRC. Part III analyzes the future effectiveness of the CCRC in correcting
miscarriages of justice, paying particular attention to the case of Northern Ireland. This Comment
concludes that although the Commission is an improvement on the Home Office, miscarriages of
justice cases still face a system riddled with many challenges.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1920, the Republic of Ireland gained independence from
the United Kingdom.' Northern Ireland remained a part of
Great Britain and governed itself via the Northern Ireland Parlia-
ment.2 The people of Northern Ireland differed among them-
selves on the future relationship between Northern Ireland and
Britain.3 The Protestant majority wanted the area to remain a
part of the United Kingdom, but many in the Catholic minority
hoped to unite Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland.4
The self-governance system of the Northern Ireland Parliament
(known as "Stormont"5 ), allowed the Protestant majority to pur-
sue discriminatory policies of employment, housing, and voting
rights against Catholics.6 These policies prevented and discour-
aged many Catholics from participating in the government of
* J.D. Candidate, 2000, Fordham University School of Law. This Note is dedicated
to my family and friends for their love and support. I would also like to thank Jane
Winter of British Irish Rights Watch for her inspiration.
1. See CAIN Project Website Glossary (visited Feb. 13, 1999) <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/
othelem/glossary.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (describing
term United Kingdom as including England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland);
see also Elizabeth Kondonijakos, Note, The Reasonable Suspicion Test of Northern Ireland's
Emergency Legislation: A Violation of the European Convention of Human Rights, 3 BUFF. J.
INT'L L. 99, 102 (1996) (explaining how British Parliament decided that autonomy for
Ireland was in Britain's best interest, after violent campaign of IRA).
2. See [AwYEas COMMIrrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENSE
IN NORTHERN IRELAND 13-14 (1993) (explaining how Northern Ireland Parliament had
jurisdiction over most governmental functions except for taxation and defense).
3. Id. at 14.
4. See id. (stating that population of Northern Ireland was approximately two-
thirds Protestant and one-third Catholic). More recent, though unofficial, figures show
to be 57% Protestant and 43% Catholic. Id.
5. See id. (explaining that Northern Ireland Parliament was called Stormont,
named after large building in which it was housed).
6. See id. at 14-15 (noting some members of Catholic minority joined IRA's infre-
quent activities, in pursuit of reunification).
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Northern Ireland.7
In the late 1960s, vast changes occurred in the political cli-
mate of Northern Ireland.8 Many Catholics, upset with the dis-
criminatory parliamentary practices, organized peaceful demon-
strations modeled after the civil rights movement in the United
States.9 The Stormont Government ignored or rejected the
demonstrators' demands, 10 and some members of the Protestant
majority responded to the marches with violence.11 The violent
response of the Protestants led some Catholic marchers to leave
the peaceful protests and join the previously inactive Irish Re-
publican Army ("IRA").12 Loyalistl" paramilitary groups also re-
surfaced,14 and in August 1969, the British government sent
troops into Northern Ireland to restore order.1 5
The violence in Northern Ireland continued,' 6 and the Brit-
ish government reacted to this violence. 17 In 1972, the British
government suspended the role of Stormont and governed
Northern Ireland directly from the British Parliament ("Parlia-
7. Id. at 15.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Oren Gross, Once More unto the Breach, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 437, 474 (1998).
11. LAWYERs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 15.
12. See id. (stating that "majority violence encouraged some in the minority to turn
away from peaceful protest to participate in the IRA"); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/
HELSINSKI, To SERVE WITHOUT FAVOR: POLICING, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
IN NORTHERN IRELAND at vii (1997) (defining Irish Republican Army as IRA); CAIN
Project Website Organizations (visited Feb. 13, 1999) <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/or-
gan/iorgan.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (describing IRA as
main Republican paramilitary group in Northern Ireland having central goal of ending
British control of Northern Ireland and unifying Northern Ireland with Republic of
Ireland).
13. See Cain Project Website Glossary, supra note 1 (defining loyalist as person who is
loyal to British Crown and noting that in context of Northern Ireland term may imply
that person is giving some support to paramilitary groups to use force to remain loyal to
Crown).
14. See LAwvYEs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 15 (explaining
how Ulster Defense Association and Ulster Volunteer Force reappeared).
15. See Gross, supra note 10, at 475 (stating that British Army assumed role of po-
lice to maintain law and order). Introducing the army into the conflict, along with
continued rioting and the rise of paramilitary groups, began the militarized stage of the
conflict. Id. As of 1992, British troops in Northern Ireland numbered approximately
18,500. LAwYERs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 15-16.
16. See LAwYERs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 15 (explaining
how violence peaked in 1972 with 467 political deaths, but had reached 3000 fatalities
by August 1993).
17. Id.
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ment").18 In 1974, the IRA expanded its terrorist campaign to
England. 9 The Parliament responded to the IRA's violence
with emergency legislation in the form of Emergency Provisions
Acts ("EPAs") and Prevention of Terrorism Acts ("PTAs").2 °
EPAs and PTAs result in the admissibility of confessions ob-
tained after extended detention and interrogation 21 and limit
due process protections.22
The emergency legislation intrudes more upon the use of
ordinary law in Northern Ireland than in England or Wales. 21
PTAs apply in all of the United Kingdom,24 but EPAs apply only
in Northern Ireland. 25 Therefore, the situation in Northern Ire-
land sets Northern Ireland apart from the criminal justice system
in the rest of the United Kingdom. 26 The climate in Northern
Ireland and the British government's reaction to it provoked nu-
merous criticisms from human rights organizations, 27 the U.S.
18. SeeJOHN JACKSON & SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT JURY: DiPLOCK TRALS IN THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 8 (1995) (explaining how when British government assumed direct
control of Northern Ireland, it re-evaluated effectiveness of criminal justice process in
context of increasing political violence). Since 1971, Stormont exercised the power of
internment, which constitutes detaining suspects without trial, but this practice intensi-
fied the situation. Id.
19. See BoB WOFFINDEN, MISCARRIAGES OFJUSTICE 215 (1987) (citing IRA bombings
in Guildford, Woolwich, and Birmingham, England in October and November, 1974).
20. See generally Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, ch. 4
(Eng.) (setting forth powers afforded to government in case of "terrorist investiga-
tions"); LAwYERs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 17; WOFFINDEN, supra
note 19, at 216 (stating that Prevention of Terrorism Acts ("PTAs") were introduced by
Home Secretary one week after Birmingham bombing).
21. LAwYERs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 17.
22. See LAwYERs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AT THE CROSSROADS: HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS 6 (1996) (explaining that under
emergency legislation, due process rights are rights most frequently and extensively
limited).
23. Id. at 60; see Gross, supra note 10, at 476 (explaining that over time emergency
legislation became more entrenched and broad-based and substantially impacted "ordi-
nary" non-emergency legislation).
24. See Brice Dickson, The Prevention of Terrorism Acts, inJUSTICE IN ERROR 178, 178
(Clive Walker et al. eds., 1993) (stating that PTAs are central to Britain's strategy against
terrorism).
25. See Gross, supra note 10, at 476 (describing Emergency Provisions Acts
("EPAs"), enacted in 1973 after bloodiest year in conflict).
26. See LAwYERs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 57 (describing
how duties of judges in states suffering from violence are particularly difficult and
Northern Ireland is no exception).
27. See generally id. at 131-35 (making recommendations regarding series of long-
term human rights violations in Northern Ireland, including use of emergency powers
and abnormal functioning of criminal justice system); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/HELSIN-
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government, 28 and internati onal bodies. 21
Over the last few decades, scholars,3" human rights organi-
zations, and civil liberties groups31 criticized the British criminal
justice system regarding miscarriages of justice. 3 2 Many high-
profile miscarriage of justice cases involved the situation in
Northern Ireland and the activity of the IRA.33 Previously, mis-
carriage of justice cases were brought before the British Home
Office or the Northern Ireland Office, once other appellate pro-
cedures had been exhausted. 4 The British government recently
established the Criminal Cases Review Commission35 ("Commis-
stu, supra note 12, at 7-13 (considering allegations of abuse by police in Northern Ire-
land in light of existence of emergency legislation that broadens police power).
28. See generally U.S. Embassy, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 1997: The
United Kingdom (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://www.usembassy.org.uk/humrtsuk.html>
(on file with the Fordham International LawJournal) (noting that Royal Ulster Constabu-
lary ("RUC") committed human rights abuses).
29. Id. The European Parliament criticized the government for allowing the RUC
to use plastic bullets in controlling riot situations. Id.; see U.N. Press Release HR/4231
(visited Feb. 14, 1999) <http://www.un.org> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) (citing committee member of U.N. Committee Against Torture expressing dis-
appointment that emergency powers of police and army were not lifted during cease-
fire).
30. See generally ROSEMARY PATTENDEN, ENGLISH CRIMINAL APPEALS 1844-1994: A-
PEALS AGAINST CONVICTION AND SENTENCE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 1-4 (1996) (exploring
history and recent developments in appellate process in light of public discussion of
miscarriages ofjustice); WOFFINDEN, supra note 19, at 324-46 (discussing miscarriages of
justice).
31. See Fiona McElree '& Keir Starmer, The Right to Silence, in JUSTICE IN ERROR,
supra note 24, at 73 (explaining that Amnesty International, Justice, and Liberty criti-
cized government for limiting right to silence).
32. See generally WOFFINDEN, supra note 19, at 3-193 (chronicling existence of cases
of miscarriages of justice, specifically from 1946 to 1986). In 1950, the government
tried, convicted, and hung Timothy Evans, who was mentally retarded, for murdering
his infant daughter. Id. at 5-6. At the trial, Evan's defense counsel argued that the
murderer was a neighbor, John Christie. Id. at 6. In 1953, three years after Evans was
hung, Christie confessed to the infant's murder and six other killings. Id. at 6.
Six Irish men living in Birmingham, England served sixteen years for the 1974 IRA
bombing of pubs in Birmingham. PADDY JOE HILL, FOREVER LOST, FOREVER GONE
(1995). A court quashed their convictions when it was discovered that police had
fabricated confession statements and that the scientific evidence against them was
faulty. Id. at 246-47.
33. See generally WOFFINDEN, supra note 19, at 213-301 (devoting several chapters of
book to cases involving suspected IRA activity, which were later discovered to be miscar-
riages of justice).
34. CCRC Ann. Rep. 1997-98, at 4.
35. Id. The Criminal Cases Review Commission ("Commission" or "CCRC") was
established under the 1995 Criminal Appeal Act and began operations in January 1998.
Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, ch. 35, § 8(1) (Eng.). The Commission is an independent
body established by the British government to investigate suspected miscarriages ofjus-
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sion" or "CCRC") as an independent body16 to review cases for
possible miscarriages ofjustice. The Commission assumed this
responsibility from the Home Office38 and from the Northern
Ireland Office 9 (or "NIO"), which previously accepted requests
for reconsideration of cases.4 ° The Commission may investigate
cases from England, Wales,41 and Northern Ireland.4 2 In con-
trast, the former system only allowed cases from Northern Ire-
land to be considered by a body in Northern Ireland, specifically
the Northern Ireland Office, as opposed to a wider United King-
dom-based body.4 3 The CCRC's structure does not allow for a
separate mechanism solely for dealing with cases from Northern
Ireland.44
This Comment considers the Commission, its establish-
tice in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. CCRC Ann. Rep. 1997-98, supra note 34,
at 4.
36. See Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, § 4(2) (explaining that Commission shall not
be regarded as servant or agent of Crown and property of Commission's is not property
of Crown).
37. Id. Miscarriage of justice is defined as "a failure to attain the deserved end
result ofjustice." Clive Walker, Introduction, in JUSTIcE IN ERROR, supra note 24, at 2.
38. See Home Office, Home Office Internet Service (visited Jan. 21, 1999) <http://
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/index.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal)
(stating that Home Office is government department handling internal affairs for Eng-
land and Wales).
39. Id.; see Northern Ireland Office, Northern Ireland Office Website (visited Feb. 13,
1999) <http://www.nio.gov.uk> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (in-
troducing Northern Ireland Office ("NIO") as office of Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland, dealing with political and constitutional matters, law and order, policing, and
criminal justice policy relating to Northern Ireland).
40. See Duncan Campbell, Guilty Until Proven Innocent, GUARDIAN, Aug. 19, 1998, at
17 (explaining that number of cases that CCRC received since taking over responsibility
from Home Office); CCRC Ann. Rep., supra note 34, at 6 (stating that cases were trans-
ferred from Northern Ireland Office and Home Office to new Commission).
41. See Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, §§ 9, 11 (Eng.) (setting forth Commission's
power to investigate cases dealt summarily and on indictment in England and Wales);
id. §§ 10, 12 (outlining Commission's role in Northern Ireland).
42. See id. §§ 9-12 (affording Commission mandate to consider cases from England
and Wales and Northern Ireland); see also Carmel Robinson, 41 Miscarriages of Justice
Dealt with In First Week, Irish Times on the Web, Apr. 9, 1997 (visited Sept. 15, 1998)
<http://www.irish-times.com/irish-times/paper/1997/0409/hom24.html> (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal).
43. See CCRC Ann. Rep., supra note 34, at 6 (explaining how cases were trans-
ferred to CCRC from Northern Ireland Office).
44. See Scottish Office, News Release - 1653/97 November 4, 1997 (visited Oct. 22,
1998) <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/news/releas97/pr1653.htm> (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal) (introducing plans to establish Scottish Criminal Cases
Review Commission, Scotland's own CCRC).
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ment, and its likely effects on miscarriages of justice. Part I of
this Comment considers British and Northern Irish law. Part I
also highlights British law leading up to the creation of the
CCRC and Northern Irish law in light of its unique elements.
Part II explains the establishment of the CCRC, its powers, and
structure. Additionally, Part II discusses various commentary on
the creation of the CCRC. Part III analyzes the future effective-
ness of the CCRC in correcting miscarriages of justice, paying
particular attention to the case of Northern Ireland. This Com-
ment concludes that although the Commission is an improve-
ment on the Home Office, miscarriages of justice cases still face
a system riddled with many challenges.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH AND NORTHERN IRISH
LAW IN RELATION TO THE CCRC
The systems ofjustice in Great Britain and Northern Ireland
share some similarities and some differences in structure and ap-
plication.45 Many of these distinctions revolve around the role
of emergency legislation.46 The notion of the CCRC developed
from criticism of these systems,47 and the CCRC performs its role
within these environments.48
A. British Law
Great Britain and Northern Ireland operate under a Parlia-
mentary system. 49 The criminal justice system consists of a prose-
cution service, 50 as well as trial and appellate courts. This sys-
tem also includes emergency legislation 2 and limits on funda-
mental rights. 53
45. See THE STATEMAN'S YEAR-BOOK: A STATISTICAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC AG
COUNT OF THE STATES OF THE WORLD FOR THE YEAR 1996-97, at 1305 (Brian Hunter ed.,
1997) (describing systems of Northern Ireland and England and Wales separately).
46. LAwYERs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 17.
47. WOFFINDEN, supra note 19, at 322.
48. See Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, §§ 9-12 (Eng.) (mandating Commission to con-
sider cases from England, Wales, and Northern Ireland). "
49. See THE STATEMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, supra note 45, at 1305 (describing structure of
Parliament).
50. Crown Prosecution Service Website (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http://
www.cps.gov.uk/home page.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
51. THE STATEMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, supra note 45, at 1305.
52. Dickson, supra note 24,.at 178.
53. Andrew Sanders & Lee Bridges, The Right to Legal Advice, in JUSTICE IN ERROR,
supra note 24, at 38.
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1. British Justice System's Bodies and Powers
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land functions under a parliamentary system.54 Criminal cases
begin with a police investigation, but are ultimately handled by a
special prosecution office of the government. 55 After a trial, de-
fendants may apply for an appeal.56 During the investigation
and prosecution processes, suspects retain certain rights.57
Emergency legislation altered some of these rights in an attempt
to deal with terrorism.58
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land functions under a Parliamentary system that consists of the
Crown, the House of Lords, 59 and the House of Commons.6 °
Some members of Parliament hold offices of Secretary of State
or minister and are responsible for supervising a government de-
partment.6 Secretaries of State and ministers also meet formally
as part of the cabinet where they discuss government policy is-
sues. 6 2 The House of Lords remains the final appellate court in
England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, although its use as such
is limited.63 The Crown maintains the Royal Prerogative of
Mercy.64
54. Id.
55. Review of the Crown Prosecution Service: Summary of the Main Report with the Conclu-
sions and Recommendations Service § 13 (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http://www.official-docu-
ments.co.uk/document/cm39/3972/summary.htm> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal); Crown Prosecution Service Website, supra note 50.
56. See THE STATEMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, supra note 45, at 1338-39.
57. Sanders & Bridges, supra note 53, at 38.
58. Dickson, supra note 24, at 187-91.
59. See THE STATEMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, supra note 45, at 1305 (describing members of
House of Lords and non-election hereditary appointment system); TERENCE INGMAN,
THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROCESS 4-11 (1996) (explaining how House of Lords retains power
as appellate court).
60. See THE STATEMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, supra note 45, at 1305-06 (describing eligibility
requirements for House of Commons and election procedures).
61. See DONALD GIFFORD & JOHN SALTER, UNDERSTANDING THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYS-
TEM 13 (1997) (explaining how Members of Parliament are responsible to Parliament
for their own actions or in-actions and also for actions or in-actions of department(s) or
statutory authority that he or she supervises).
62. Id. at 13-14.
63. See INGMAN, supra note 59, at 4-5 (stating that criminal cases must involve
points of law of general public importance and be given permission by Court of Appeal
or House of Lords to be considered by House of Lords). Only a few cases manage to
reach the House of Lords as many fail to meet these two criteria. Id. at 8.
64. See PATTENDEN, supra note 30, at 359, 378-79 (stating that Royal Prerogative of
Mercy can be exercised by way of free pardon or remission of sentence). The Crown
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Criminal cases begin with police investigations," are trans-
ferred to the Crown Prosecution Service66 ("CPS"), and then
may end up in the court system. 67 The CPS6" initiates criminal
prosecutions in the United Kingdom.69 The case is then
brought to the Magistrate Courts.70 If the case involves a sum-
mary offense, then it will be heard before a Magistrate Court, by
a judge or justice of the peace, without a jury.7' If a charge is
indictable, then it is transferred to the Crown Court where ajury
hears the case.7 2
Appeals are initially heard by different courts depending on
which court held the trial. 73 The Crown Court hears appeals on
cases from the Magistrate Courts. 4 Appeals from the Crown
has maintained the power to pardon a defendant for centuries. Id. The prerogative to
do so derives from the sovereign's power to determine punishments for crimes. Id. at
378.
65. See Review of the Crown Prosecution Service, supra note 55, § 13 (stating that police
obtain evidence as part of investigation prior to handing cases to the Crown Prosecu-
tion Service ("CPS")).
66. See Crown Prosecution Service Website, supra note 50 (describing CPS as "a na-
tional service, working closely with the police, the courts and others in the criminal
justice system to improve its effectiveness"); see also Review of the Crown Prosecution Service,
supra note 55, § 1 (stating CPS is headed by Director of Public Prosecutions and under
superintendent of Attorney General). The Attorney General is a minister of Parliament
and is responsible for the conduct of most criminal prosecutions. What Is the Crown
Prosecution Service? (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http://www.cps.gov.uk/cpsa/whatis.htm>
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
67. See GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, SOURCE BOOK ON ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 292-
93 (1996) (describing CPS's discretion in deciding whether to prosecute).
68. Id. at 369. Until the legislation was enacted in 1986, the responsibility of initi-
ating criminal prosecutions rested with the police. Id. The CPS followed from a 1970
report by Justice arguing that the police did not consider the public policy issues in
prosecuting and that the involvement of the police in the actual investigation might
encourage police to prosecute even in light of weak evidence. Id.
69. Prosecution Offenses Act, 1985, § 10 (Eng.). The police decide on the charge
and prepare the case file for the CPS. Review of the Crown Prosecution Service, supra note
55. This report was presented to Parliament by the Attorney General in June 1998. Id.
The Attorney General criticized the CPS, particularly stating that the CPS should have
an earlier role in producing prosecution files, currently a role of the police. Id. § 13.
70. GIFFORD & SALTER, supra note 61, at 54.
71. See id. at 66 (explaining that case is summary not necessarily because it is not
serious, but because Parliament has designated it to be summary offense). Magistrate
Courts can impose fine up to UK£5000 and jail sentence up to six months for each
offense. THE STATEMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, supra note 45, at 1338.
72. See GIwORD & SALTER, supra note 61, at 66 (defining indictable as requiring
judge or jury).
73. THE STATEMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, supra note 45, at 1338-39.
74. See id. (describing how appeals from magistrates are heard by Crown Court
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Court go to the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division ("CACD").
Only appeals that involve a question of law go right to the Court
of Appeal.76 The Attorney General in Northern Ireland, and in
England and Wales, can also refer a case to the Court of Appeal
in order to have the sentence imposed by the Crown Court in-
creased.77
The Government in Great Britain require the police to in-
form arrested suspects of certain rights. 7' Following recent
changes in legislation, 79 defendants possess an absolute right to
legal advice and to be made aware of that right, yet there is no
mechanism to enforce this right."0 Police do maintain the dis-
cretion, however, to delay legal advice, and in the case of sus-
pects under the PTAs, some rights are not guaranteed."
The right to silence has been encroached upon across the
United Kingdom through Parliament's legislation,8 2  even
though this move was criticized by the Royal Commission on
CriminalJustice ("RCCJ").83 Since 1968, several pieces of legisla-
when it regards conviction or sentence, but cases go to Divisional High Court when only
point of law is involved).
75. See id. at 1139.
76. Id.
77. See BRICE DICKSON, LEGAL SYSTEM OF NORTHERN IRELAND 160 (1993) (explain-
ing how this provision became law when highly publicized sex offenders received light
sentences from trial judges).
78. See Sanders & Bridges, supra note 53, at 38 (explaining how suspects arrested
are supposed to be informed about right to legal advice, to have someone know about
their arrest, and to make phone call).
79. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 60, § 58(1) (Eng.) (stating that
person arrested and held in custody is entitled to consult solicitor privately at any time,
if he so requests); Sanders & Bridges; supra note 53, at 38 (noting that Code of Practice
for Detention, Treatment, and Questioning of Persons by Police requires that legal ad-
vice is absolute right and that police must inform persons detained of such right).
80. See Sanders & Bridges, supra note 53, at 38-39 (analyzing research studies of
particular police stations that show that 25% of all suspects requested legal advice and
that 21% received it, but contending that it does not make sense why three out of four
suspects who are supposed to be informed as to their right to legal advice would in
effect refuse free gift of advice).
81. Id. at 38. Six to eight percent of those requesting legal advice fail to receive it
or receive it when it is already too late. Id. at 39.
82. Mark Berger, Of Policy, Politics and Parliament: The Legislative Rewriting of the
British Right to Silence, 22 Am. J. CriM. L. 391 (1995).
83. See Adrian Clarke, A Painfully Slow Process, 146 NEw L.J. 946, 946 (1996) (ex-
plaining how Royal Commission on Criminal Justice ("RCCJ") specifically disapproved
of abolition of right to silence in police stations). The RCCJ was established in 1991 to
examine the effectiveness of the criminal justice system in England and Wales in con-
victing the guilty and acquitting the innocent. Walker, supra note 37, at 1. The RCCJ
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tion have included restrictions on the right to silence.84 Many
have limited the defendant's right not to speak in particular cir-
cumstances when charged with certain offenses.8" The Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 allows juries to draw adverse
inferences from the defendant's silence prior to trial. 86
Proponents of the argument favoring the abolition of the
right to pre-trial silence believe that the right to silence only pro-
tects the guilty.8 7 The right to silence prior to trial gives the de-
fendant the opportunity to fabricate a defense for the trial. 88 An
innocent defendant, however, may be inadequately informed of
his charge and believe that remaining silent may be more benefi-
cial than trying to respond to an unclear accusation.89
In order to control terrorism, and specifically paramilitary
activity associated with Northern Ireland, the British government
enacted PTAs.9  Much of the PTAs occurred as an immediate
was also given the responsibility of considering the use of resources, whether changes
are needed in the conduct of police investigations, the role of prosecutors and experts,
provisions and opportunities for the defendant to state his position, the court's power
in directing proceedings, the Court of Appeal's role, and the arrangements for dealing
with and investigating miscarriages ofjustice. Id.
84. See McElree & Starmer, supra note 31, at 62-64 (listing several pieces of legisla-
tion, including Theft Act, 1968, § 31, Supreme Court Act, § 72, Criminal Justice Act
1987, § 2, and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988, that limited defend-
ant's right to silence).
85. See id. at 59 (stating that right to silence does not have universal application
and has in many instances been restricted).
86. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, §§ 34, 36, 37 (Eng.); see PETER
MIRFIELD, SILENCE, CONFESSIONS AND IMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 240 (1997) (not-
ing that common law did allow some inferences to be drawn from silence of accused,
but this legislation extends applicability).
87. See id. at 242 (quoting Bentham on right to silence, who stated that innocence
never takes advantage of right to silence, as innocence claims right of speaking, and as
guilt invokes privilege of silence). Bentham was considering the right to silence at trial,
where there already are certain safeguards in place, including the presumption of inno-
cence and the fact that is open and recorded. Id. A committee took his statements,
however, and used them to alter the right to pre-trial silence. Id.
88. See id. at 243 (explaining that if suspect had to speak when arrested, he would
state any defenses at that time, whereas right to silence allows him not say anything until
he has come up with defense).
89. Id. at 245; see McElree & Starmer, supra note 31, at 59 (explaining that right to
silence preserves human dignity by defining nature of relationship with individual and
state and provides safeguards for vulnerable against wrongful convictions).
90. See Dickson, supra note 24, at 178 (explaining that since mid-1970s emergency
legislation under PTAs forms central part of British government's regulatory strategy
against terrorism).
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reaction to a series of bombings,9" and the British government
designed the PTAs to prevent terrorism rather than to eliminate
it. 92 Similarly, at least some of the PTAs exist for political rea-
sons, mainly to demonstrate that the British government is doing
something to prevent terrorism.93
PTAs do not demonstrate an equilibrium between measures
necessary to combat terrorism and the protection of civil rights
of society.9 4 Under current legislation, police may arrest persons
with very little cause and hold them for up to seven days without
formally charging them with a crime.95 The European Court of
Human Rights struck down the seven day detention provision as
a violation of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("European Conven-
tion"), yet the British government has chosen to ignore that rul-
ing.9
6
PTAs allow police to search with additional powers, includ-
ing both relaxed requirements for the types of materials for
which the police can search and greater ease in obtaining search
warrants.97 Additionally, high level police officers may override
the need for a search warrant if they reasonably believe that an
emergency exists that demands immediate action." These pow-
ers lack safeguards that would otherwise protect their overzeal-
ous application. 9 The British government needs the power to
counteract terrorism, but it is argued by some authors that these
91. See id. (stating that bombings in pubs in Birmingham created panic that led in
part to PTAs).
92. Id. at 179.
93. Id. at 194.
94. See id. at 178 (stating that inordinately broad power of arrest that emergency
legislation allows and its powers to detain are not in line with liberal democracy
founded on rule of law).
95. See id. at 189 (explaining that official justification for these powers is to allow
police enough time to gather evidence to justify charging detainee with crime, however,
only one-quarter of those detained are ever charged with any crime).
96. Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1988); see
Dickson, supra note 24, at 189 (describing holding in Brogan and Others v. United King-
dom, where European Court of Human Rights ruled that British government breached
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms).
97. See Dickson, supra note 24, at 192-93 (delineating eight respects where PTA
allows greater search powers).
98. Id. at 193.
99. See id. at 194 (noting that much of emergency legislation overlaps with ordi-
nary rules of law, but does so while stripping away protective safeguards).
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provisions seem to do so at the cost of unnecessarily limiting fun-
damental rights. 100
2. The CCRC's Legal Background
Criminal justice scholars debated the issue of justice in the
nineteenth century when there was no mechanism available to
correct false verdicts.' Since then, the Court of Appeal 0 2 (or
"Court") and the Home Office acquired the responsibility of cor-
recting miscarriages of justice.'0° In recent decades, the United
Kingdom faced public criticism regarding the existence of mis-
carriages of justice.10 4 Many cases that received high publicity
involved suspected IRA terrorist activities.10 5 Several other rec-
ognized miscarriages, however, occurred outside of the terrorist
context.'0 6
Prior to the establishment of the formal appellate court, the
public clamor for reform reached Parliament. 10 7 The percep-
tion of criminal appeals as non-political in nature weakened the
import of establishing a criminal appeal process.10 8 Parliament
finally approved the Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom fol-
lowing the exposure of two miscarriages ofjustice.'a 9 Parliament
supposedly designed the Court to correct miscarriages of justice,
and the Court initiated formal appeal procedures in 1907.110
100. See id. (questioning whether PTAs are necessary since other laws exist that
have same purpose, but also have sufficient safeguards that PTAs lack).
101. See WOFFINDEN, supra note 19, at 321 (describing how no machinery existed
for correcting errors in criminal trials and how judges resisted such machinery).
102. See id. (stating Court of Appeal (or "Court") was established in 1907, after 31
bills in Parliament failed to do so, and was created to remedy miscarriages of justice);
PATrrENDEN, supra note 30, at 30-31 (stating that controversy surrounding series of con-
victions persuaded politicians of need for criminal appeal system).
103. See WOFFINDEN, supra note 19, at 324 (describing how in 1968, Home Office
gained powers to refer cases of miscarriage ofjustice back to Court and to recommend
to Crown exercise of pardon).
104. See PATrENDEN, supra note 30, at v (stating in General Editor's Introduction
that public discussion regarding miscarriages ofjustice in 1980s and 1990s centered on
British criminal appeal structure).
105. Walker, supra note 37, at 8.
106. Id.
107. PATrENDEN, supra note 30, at 28.
108. See id. at 27 (citing lack of political will to push legislation on what was re-
garded as non-political issue).
109. See id. at 28-29 (explaining case of Adolf Beck's mistaken identification and
conviction). The second case involved George Edalji, who the government wrongly
convicted of animal maiming. Id. at 30.
110. WOFFINDEN, supra note 19, at 321.
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The Court, however, never seemed to consider the defendant's
guilt or innocence as its founders originally intended, but re-
stricted its work to points of law.''
The appellate process in the United Kingdom continues to
interpret its role narrowly.1 12 The Court is reluctant to expand
its role and become more critical of the original trial 11 because
the Court and the public appreciate the need for closure in the
appellate process, so that a case has a true point of termina-
tion.114 The Court considers only points of law because it also
fears a flood of cases. 1 5 Furthermore, the Court restricts appel-
late issues because it wishes to preserve jury findings and to em-
phasize the importance of the original trial. 1 16
In the early 1960s, Justice,' 1 7 a non-governmental organiza-
tion ("NGO"), initiated an inquiry into the existence of judicial
miscarriages or errors." 8 In 1964, the British government began
its own investigation of the Court of Appeal with the Donovan
Commission. 19 This investigation caused the British govern-
ment to reconsider the criminal justice system and led to the
introduction of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 ("1968 Act").12°
Under the 1968 Act, the Home Office acquired the power to
consider cases after an applicant had exhausted his rights at the
appellate level.12' The Home Secretary could act on his own ini-
tiative and recommend that the Queen exercise her Royal Pre-
rogative of Mercy. 1 22 Alternatively, under the 1968 Act, the
111. See id. at 321 (quoting Lord Paget, Member of Parliament, stating that Court's
original function was forgotten and Court confined itself to considering points of law).
112. Id. at 322.
113. Id. at 323.
114. Id. at 322.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 323 (stating that if jury decisions were regularly overturned, jury
decisions would lose value and juries themselves would not take their roles as seriously).
117. See Clare Dyer, In Pursuit of Justice, GuARlAN, June 17, 1997, at T17 (stating
thatJustice began in 1957 and has become British branch of International Commission
on Jurists).
118. WOFFINDEN, supra note 19, at 322.
119. See id. (noting that British government recognized authority and respectful-
ness that Justice's report would receive, and therefore government initiated their own
investigation to counteract Justice's investigation).
120. Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, ch. 19, § 2 (Eng.).
121. Id. § 17.
122. WOFFINDEN, supra note 19, at 323. The Home Office could recommend that
the Crown exercise the royal prerogative of mercy prior to the establishment of the
Court of Appeal. PATTENDEN, supra note 30, at 28.
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Home Office maintained the right to send a case back to the
Court if the decision was unsafe and unsatisfactory. 123
The Home Office and its Northern Irish counterpart, the
Northern Irish Office, assumed the role of considering miscar-
riages of justice, but the offices have been criticized.1 24 The
Home Office and the Northern Ireland Office faced huge
backlogs of cases waiting to be considered, and this backlog re-
sulted in extensive delays. 125 In its role of investigating cases for
miscarriages of justice, the Home Office operated within a cul-
ture of secrecy. 1 26 Under Home Office investigations, the first
and sometimes the only correspondence that the Home Office
might send a defendant was a concise rejection of the peti-
tion.12 7 A report by the RCCJ1 2 ' recommended that the Home
Office should disclose any new evidence that comes to light dur-
ing an investigation that is relevant to a representation or casts
doubt on a conviction. 129 Additionally, in 1994, Lord Justice Si-
mon Brown, in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex
parte Hickey and others ("Hickey case"), ruled that the Home Of-
fice had not been forthcoming with evidence and that the Home
Office should not withhold any information that would help the
applicant best present his case.l3 °
In the past, the Court did not embrace the involvement of
the Home Office in the appeals process and therefore looked
unfavorably at some cases referred to it by the Home Office. 3'
Justice's 1971 Annual Report criticized the Court of Criminal
123. See Criminal Appeals Act, 1968, ch. 19, § 1 (a), 17 (stating Court of Appeal will
allow appeal against conviction if judges on Court think that conviction is unsafe).
124. See Michael Mansfield & Nicholas Taylor, Post Conviction Procedures, inJusTicE
IN ERROR, supra note 24, at 163 (stating that "such have been the quantity and scale of
recent mistakes that the post-appeal system [Home Office] itself could be regarded as
the ultimate miscarriage ofjustice").
125. Crania Langdon-Down,Justice Will Be Done, INDEPENDENT, Mar. 30, 1998, at 23.
126. Clarke, supra note 83, at 946.
127. Mansfield & Taylor, supra note 124, at 164-65.
128. Walker, supra note 37, at 1.
129. Clarke, supra note 83, at 946.
130. See R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hickey and
others, I All E.R. 490 (1995) (holding that in accordance with Section 17 of Criminal
Appeal Act 1968, convicted prisoners are entitled to disclosure of new evidence that
police uncover in conducting investigations for Home Office and have opportunity to
use that material in their petition to Home Office).
131. Kate Malleson, The Criminal Cases Review Commission: How Will It Work?, CRIM.
L. REv. 929, 934 (1995).
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Appeal' 3 2 ("CACD") for not handling two cases that seemed wor-
thy for appeal.13 3 Justice suggested that the CACD refused to
handle these cases because, among other reasons, the Home Of-
fice had repeatedly referred another case to the CACD and the
CACD had rejected it each time."3 Justice's report also criti-
cized the CACD for its unwillingness to reconsider cases that the
CACD had previously dismissed and to reopen cases that the
CACD believed that it had finalized. 135
According to one author, years later, the contempt of the
CACD towards repeat appeals grew because of pressures from
the public, the press, and politicians. 136 The media's investiga-
tion of miscarriages of justice and its televised portrayal of mis-
carriages particularly upset some judges and further damaged
the relationship between the Home Office and the CACD.1 37
One of these judges made a comment at the first and unsuccess-
ful appeal of the Birmingham Six,138 stating that the longer a
case continues, the more convinced the Court becomes that the
original decision was correct.1
39
132. See PATrENDEN, supra note 30, at 2 (explaining that Court of Appeal, Criminal
Division ("CACD") can hear appeals from Crown Court on sentence, or against convic-
tion of error of law, error of fact, or both).
133. Id. at 368.
134. See id. (describing reluctance of CACD to intervene in two cases because
Cooper and McMahon affair was sent to CACD by Home Office four times).
135. Id.
136. See id. (discussing speech given at London School of Economics by Stephen
Sedley QC, who worked on high profile miscarriage of justice case and is now High
Court judge).
137. See id. (noting Lord Denning's statement that television's involvement with
these cases undermined public confidence in criminal justice system). Lord Lane at-
tacked the BBC TV program, Rough Justice, for its reporting of a particular case, which
Lord Lane said contained fallacies and unsupported assumptions. Id.
138. See HILL, supra note 32, at 246-47 (explaining that Birmingham Six were six
men charged, wrongly convicted, and sentenced for IRA bombing in Birmingham, Eng-
land in November 1974). They were finally released from prison in March 1991. Id.
139. See id. at 369 (quoting now infamous comment Lord Lane CJ regarding Bir-
mingham Six case, who stated: "as has happened before in references by the Home
Secretary to this court.., under the Criminal Appeal Act of 1968, the longer this case
has gone on, the more convinced this court has become that the verdict of the jury was
correct."). As stated earlier, the Birmingham Six were released from detention in 1991
as it became evident that the evidence that convicted them was insufficient. See id. at
250 (quoting Lord Justice Lloyd speaking to Birmingham Six, "In light of fresh evi-
dence which has become available since the last hearing in this court, your appeal will
be allowed and you will be free to go.").
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B. Northern Irish Law
The criminal justice system in Northern Ireland is not iso-
lated from miscarriages of justice.14 ° Although the number of
allegations of such incidents grew in recent years, allegations of
miscarriages ofjustice occur with less frequency than in England
and Wales.141 The British government retains control over
Northern Ireland though a Secretary of State."' 2 The legal sys-
tem and specific emergency legislation create a system in North-
ern Ireland that differs from the rest of the United Kingdom."'
Currently, the British government maintains power over
Northern Ireland.144 The recent Agreement Reached in Multi-
Party Negotiations11 5 ("Agreement") is expected to bring signifi-
cant changes to the system. 14 6 For the most part, however, these
changes have yet to be implemented because the Assembly, the
new legislative body created under the Agreement, does not yet
have legislative powers. 147
The Northern Ireland Office is the major government body
under the old system in Northern Ireland"'8 and is headed by
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. 14 9 The Secretary of
State attends meetings as a member of the British Cabinet.'
140. SeeJACKSON & DORAN, supra note 18, at 51 (stating that since 1987 number of
allegations of miscarriages ofjustice in Northern Ireland grew, citing examples of cases
held to be miscarriages).
141. Id.
142. Northern Ireland Office Website, supra note 39.
143. See THE STATEMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, supra note 45, at 1337-43, 1369-70 (describing
justice systems in Northern Ireland and England and Wales separately); see also LAwYERs
COMMITrEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 17 (describing existence and use of
additional emergency legislation in Northern Ireland).
144. DICKSON, supra note 77, at 11.
145. Agreement Reached in Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998 [hereinafter
Agreement].
146. See id. (creating specific democratic institutions in Northern Ireland, North/
South Ministerial Council, and Councils between Ireland and rest of the United King-
dom).
147. Id., Validation, Implementation and Review 3; see John Mullin, Policy and
Politics: Blair Steps Up the Pressure on Arms, GuARDIAN, Mar. 4, 1999, at 11 (stating that
deadline for transfer of legislative power to Belfast Assembly is March 10, 1999,
although fears exist that deadline will not be reached because decommissioning debate
continues).
148. Northern Ireland Office Website, supra note 39.
149. Id. The Secretary of State is answerable to the British Parliament. Id.
150. Id.
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The NIO mirrors the British Home Office... in its role of di-
recting and controlling political, constitutional, security, and
criminal justice matters. 15 2 The NIO office also oversees the
work of six social and economic departments. 15 3
England and Wales operate a separate judiciary from the
judiciary in Northern Ireland.154 The legal system in Northern
Ireland today reflects the system in England and Wales, but
Northern Ireland operates its own system 55 and is greatly af-
fected by emergency legislation. 156  When Ireland was parti-
tioned in 1920, Northern Ireland established its own legal sys-
tem.1 57 Like England and Wales, the House of Lords acts as the
final court of appeal in cases of major importance involving
points of law.158 The Court, the Crown Court,.159 and the Magis-
trate Courts' 60 play the same role in England and Wales and
Northern Ireland.161  Some types of cases, however, specified
under emergency legislation, are tried without ajury, in Diplock
Courts.1
62
151. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining role of Home Office as
handling internal affairs).
152. Northern Ireland Office Website, supra note 39.
153. See id. (stating that NIO is responsible for Department of Agriculture, Depart-
ment of Economic Development, Department of Education, Department of the Envi-
ronment, Department of Finance and Personnel, and Department of Health and Social
Services).
154. See generally THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, supra note 45, at 1337-43, 1369-70
(devoting two separate sections to discussion of judiciary in Northern Ireland and in
England and Wales).
155. Id.
156. See Gross, supra note 10, at 477 ("Northern Irish legislation combines perma-
nent, complex, and de facto aspects of emergency regimes. Conceptualizing the situa-
tion in terms of 'deviations' and 'aberrations' from an otherwise general rule of 'nor-
mality' patently misses the point. Emergency is the norm in Northern Ireland.").
157. DICKSON, supra note 77, at 3.
158. Northern Ireland Government WWW Server (visited Feb. 17, 1999) <http://
www.nics.gov.uk/pubsec/courts/crtchart.htm> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
159. Id. The Crown Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear all serious criminal
cases. Id.
160. Id. The Magistrate Courts hear less serious criminal cases and also determine
whether a case should be brought before the Crown Court. Id.
161. See THE STATEMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, supra note 45, at 1'338-39 (discussing Court of
Appeal, Crown Court, and Magistrates Court in England and Wales); see also Northern
Ireland Government VVWW Server, supra note 158 (describing roles of courts in Northern
Ireland Court Service).
162. Northern Ireland Government WWW Server, supra note 158. Non-jury trials are
called Diplock Courts and are part of the emergency legislation. See Martin Flaherty,
Human Rights Violations Against Defense' Lawyers: The Case of Northern Ireland, 7 HARV.
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1. Emergency Legislation
PTAs apply in Northern Ireland, but additional emergency
legislation, unique to Northern Ireland, also exists.16 Parlia-
ment enacted stronger legislation in 1 9 7 3 ,164 and again in
1991,165 that applies only in Northern Ireland.' 66 This legisla-
tion, which does not preserve traditional procedural rights, re-
moved some of the protective gates between arrest and convic-
tion.167
The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights168 claims that
this legislation creates the core of a system formulated to convict
defendants in cases involving suspected paramilitary activity.'69
The alleged scheme under this system works by convicting sus-
pects based on confessions that result from prolonged deten-
tions and intense interrogation. 170  The law allows for intern-
ment without trial and permits police to stop, question, and
search persons without prior approval from a judge. 17 ' The au-
thorities also have the power to search residences and to seize
HUM. RTs. J. 87, 96 (1994) (defining Diplock Courts as courts lacking juries, in which
offenses are often, but not necessarily related to political violence). All cases that may
have a terrorist connection, including murder, manslaughter, riot, most not-fatal of-
fenses against the person, robbery, aggravated burglary, arson, offenses involving fire-
arms and explosives, and membership of proscribed organizations, are tried by Diplock
Courts. JACKSON & DOPRAN, supra note 18, at 11. The Attorney General may deem a
particular case to have no connection with the emergency situation and therefore allow
a jury trial. Id. Some types of offenses, however, including robbery and aggravated
burglary involving firearms or explosives cannot be moved from the Diplock context
even if they are unrelated to the political conflict. Id.
163. See LAwYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 17 (stating that
emergency legislation has been feature of Northern Ireland since Northern Ireland was
established originally as temporary provision, but since 1933 it is permanent feature of
Northern Ireland legal system).
164. Gross, supra note 10, at 476.
165. See id. at 476 (explaining how 1991 legislation created new offenses and gave
authorities additional emergency powers).
166. LAwYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 1.
167. Flaherty, supra note 162, at 95.
168. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, About Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights (visitedJan. 21, 1999) <http://www.lchr.org/aboutlchr/aboutlchr.htm> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal) (describing Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights as organization begun in 1978 to protect and promote fundamental human
rights).
169. LAwYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 1; see id. at 4
(describing how under PTA arrested individual may be held for as long as seven days
without being charged with crime).
170. Id.
171. See Flaherty, supra note 162, at 96 (stating that EPA empowers police to stop
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documents without prior judicial approval. 172 One author as-
serts that the British government uses terrorism as a justification
for the imposition of draconian powers in Northern Ireland.
173
2. Mechanisms Prior to Trial
In addition to the Diplock Courts, the pre-trial procedures
differ in Northern Ireland and effect the trial process. 174 The
trial is not isolated from the earlier phases of the criminal pro-
cess. 1 7 5 Some of these pre-trial procedures and their impact on
the trial have raised questions regarding the use of Diplock
Courts.
1 7 6
In Northern Ireland, emergency legislation is used more
broadly than elsewhere in the United Kingdom, 177 and it has
greater scope and strength.1 78 The broadness of the effect of the
legislation in Northern Ireland is regardless of whether the legis-
lation is confined to Northern Ireland or applies across the
United Kingdom.' 79 Accordingly, scholars contend that this leg-
islation has intruded more upon the use of ordinary law in
Northern Ireland than in England or Wales. 8 ° The Agreement
initiated reviews of the current legislation, but the Agreement
does not specifically mandate the elimination of PTAs or
EPAs.' 81 No immediate prospect exists for Parliament to over-
turn, repeal, or amend this legislation, and it has actually re-
cently extended it for two years. 182 The Lawyers Committee for
and question persons regarding their identity and movements, to search persons and
their homes, and to seize documents without prior judicial approval).
172. Id:
173. Kondonijakos, supra note 1, at 115.
174. SeeJAcKSoN & DORAN, supra note 18, at 32 (explaining how special evidentiary
rules are part of emergency legislation, therefore effecting link between pre-trial proce-
dures and trial).
175. Id.
176. See id. (stating that combined effect of search powers, lenient arrest powers,
seven-day detentions, questionable interrogations, weak restrictions on admissibility of
confessions, and non-jury trials produced system weighted against defendant).
177. See LAwyRs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 60 (stating that
emergency legislation is implemented more widely in Northern Ireland and has ef-
fected ordinary law more in Northern Ireland than in England and Wales).
178. Gross, supra note 10, at 476.
179. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 60.
180. Id. at 60; Gross, supra note 10, at 476.
181. Agreement, supra note 145.
182. Tim Cunningham, The Sound of SACHR's Silence, JUST NEWS (Committee on
the Administration of Justice), Sept. 1998, at 6.
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Human Rights believes that because of the divided nature of the
society, confidence in, and adherence to, the law is essential to
any lasting agreement.18
Several authors contend that as the climate improves in
Northern Ireland, the need for emergency legislation will sub-
side."8 4 There is still, however, no immediate prospect that the
emergency legislation will be repealed.185 Authors believe that
ideally this legislation will be amended and fundamental rights
will be afforded greater protection.18 6 In the meantime, this leg-
islation does exist and has an impact on cases from Northern
Ireland. 18 7 Emergency legislation allows police to take confes-
sions under questionable circumstances and ensures that the
prosecution can use these confessions and other implicating
statements at trial. 188
Under the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order of
1988, a negative inference may be drawn from the defendant's
exercise of the right to silence at arrest, pretrial, and even at trial
under certain circumstances.' 8 9 Authors are particularly con-
cerned with the effect of this legislation in the Diplock Courts. 90
This infringement is of particular concern in a highly-politicized
environment like Northern Ireland, where a substantial part of
the population feels alienated from the police force. 9 '
183. LAwYERs COMMITTEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 61.
184. Kondonijakos, supra note 1, at 115; seeJACKSON & DORAN, supra note 18, at 9
(stating that due to events indicating future peace in Northern Ireland, it is time for
revision of emergency legislation approaches).
185. SeeJAcKSoN & DORAN, supra note 18, at 9 (contending that restoration of jury
trial, that is, elimination of Diplock Courts, which are part of emergency legislation, for
all indictable offenses is unlikely in near future, and even if so, it would be gradual
phase out).
186. Kondonijakos, supra note 1, at 99, 115.
187. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 60.
188. See Flaherty, supra note 162, at 109 (stating that under emergency legislation
police have conditions, time, and freedom to procure confessions and can produce
those confessions with ease at trial).
189. Id. at 111.
190. SeeJAcSON & DORAN, supra note 18, at 32 (stating that changing confession
rules and right to silence most likely would concern itself, but when applied to non-jury
trials, where common law traditions have already been infringed concern has been in-
tensified).
191. See LAwYERs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 72 ("Silence in
the face of... authorities is as logically consistent with fear and civil non-cooperation as
with consciousness of guilt.").
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3. Diplock Courts
The British government established the Diplock Courts over
twenty years ago. 192 Critics maintain that courts lacking juries
are problematic, based on their history and possible rigidness. 93
Individual rights receive greater limitations under the Diplock
Courts.'94
Diplock Courts try defendants accused of certain offenses
without juries.195 Judges, who determine fact and law in these
cases, operate under relaxed rules of evidence.' 9 6 The Emer-
gency Powers Act ("1991 EPA") of 1991 added new offenses to
the list of prosecutable crimes and gave the police more emer-
gency powers. 197 Michael Mansfield, a well-known attorney spe-
cializing in miscarriage of justice cases,'9 " contends that there is
a hidden agenda to limit jury trials in the United Kingdom and
cites Northern Ireland's Diplock Courts as an example.' 99 Mans-
field believes that juries are the most democratic element in the
British judicial system, but that authorities view juries as a threat
to their system. 200 Mansfield further states that miscarriages of
justice cases have not arisen due to the fault of juries.2 '
Diplock Courts face criticism of becoming case hardened. 20 2
Case hardening occurs where judges acclimate and readily ac-
cept evidence of the police and security forces over the evidence
of the defense. 20 3 The prosecution often relies upon confessions
192. See JACKSON & DORAN, supra note 18, at 8-9 (stating that government estab-
lished Diplock Commission to consider whether changes should be made to better deal
with terrorism).
193. MICHAEL MANSFIELD,JUSTICE UNDONE, reprinted in SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note
67, at 533-34; see JACKSON & DORAN, supra note 18, at 39 (noting that Diplock Court
judges may too easily accept evidence).
194. Flaherty, supra note 162, at 110.
195. Gross, supra note 10, at 475.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See Kevin Toolis, The Best Form of Attack: Michael Mansfield Is the Undisputed
Champion of the Miscarriage-of-Justice Trial, GUARDIAN, Oct. 25, 1997, at 36 (chronicling
Mansfield's involvement with many high profile miscarriage of justice cases, including
Birmingham Six).
199. MANSFIELD, supra note 193.
200. See id. (stating that authorities are threatened based on their arrogance that
they know who is guilty, better than jury).
201. Id.
202. See JACKSON & DORAN, supra note 18, at 30 (explaining that several factors
have led to possibility of easy acceptance of evidence by Diplock Court judges).
203. Id.
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that form the basis of many of the prosecution's cases, as wit-
nesses generally do not exist or are reluctant to become in-
volved.214 Michael Mansfield contends that confessions are the
most unreliable source of evidence because they often result
from police pressures, and courts fail to instruct juries ade-
quately to consider their credibility.205
Because many of the prosecution's paramilitary cases are
based on confessions, the deterioration of the right to silence
has the potential to be even more problematic. 20 6 According to
one author, the continued use of doubtful confessions makes
the effective use of the right to silence even more important. 207
The European Court of Human Rights held that the lack of the
right to silence in the context of Northern Ireland, where access
to attorneys is delayed, violated the fair trial provisions agreed to
in the European Convention.20 8
As the evidence standards apply, confessions continue to
play a role in many Diplock Court cases. 20 9 In 1981, an in-
dependent study reported that the Director of Prosecutions in
Northern Ireland used confessions in eighty-nine percent of
scheduled offense cases, 210 and the frequency of use of confes-
sions is expected not to have changed since.211 In a 1994 inter-
view, Sir Patrick Mayhew, the Secretary of Northern Ireland, said
that uncorroborated confessions are admissible.212 He stated
that while there is a good argument for the belief that confes-
sions must be corroborated before they can be admissible, he
does not think corroboration is necessary.213
204. See id. at 30-31 (stating that prosecution would have limited success if relying
on civilian witnesses, as often they do not exist and when they do they are afraid to
become involved with cases involving members of terrorist organizations). The lack of
other witnesses has accentuated the importance of confessions. Id.
205. See MANSFIELD, supra note 193, at 533-34 (citing plea bargains and lesser
sentences as pressures to confess, and lack of instructions to jury to consider reliability
of such evidence).
206. Flaherty, supra note 162, at 111.
207. Id.
208. Murray v. United Kingdom, Case 41/1994/488/570 (1996).
209. Flaherty, supra note 162, at 110.
210. Id.
211. See id. (stating that the Committee for Administration of Justice ("CAJ") be-
lieves that there has been no change in these figures of significance).
212. Mary Ann Dadisman, Irish Question: Into the Lion's Den, 21 HUM. RTs. 14, 16
(1994).
213. Id.
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4. Judges and the Judicial Framework in Northern Ireland
The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights acknowledges
that Northern Ireland judges are committed professionals, oper-
ating in an often hostile environment. 214 Concern exists, how-
ever, that the judiciary in Northern Ireland is not sufficiently
aware of its responsibilities to protect the rights of defendants,
particularly when many basic rights are already limited.215 The
role of judge is even more crucial when there are no juries at
trials and pre-trial processes and rules of procedure are signifi-
cantly altered.216 The changes to the trial proceedings undoubt-
edly affected the judiciary and modified its perception within the
community.217 The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights notes
that history scarred the perception of judges and their reputa-
tion for independence with nationalists and loyalists alike.21 8
After courts squashed a series of convictions following ex-
tensive criticism that the evidence used to convict was not trust-
worthy, judges hesitated to convict without corroboration. 2 9 Be-
cause of potential and actual damage to the reputation of the
courts, an adjustment of priorities emerged, initially by individ-
ual judges, but then spreading to the Court.22° Although the
Court corrected these cases, no mechanism exists to prevent
judges from making this type of error again. 22 ' The Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights argues that returning to a system
of trial by jury would be the best mechanism to prevent convic-
tions based on untrustworthy evidence.222
The recent case of Baker, Groves, and Valente illustrates
214. [AwYERs COMMIT"EE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 60.
215. Id, at 61. Individual judges in the system seem to believe that the decisions of
local authorities have greater insight into problems of terrorism than European Com-
mission on Human Rights. Gross, supra note 10, at 437, 479.
216. See LAWvERs COMMiTtEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 68-69 (stating
that in divided society judges must ensure that law is applied equally and it is perceived
that way and also noting context of no-jury trial in which courts function).
217. Id.
218. See id. at 70 (discussing series of criticized cases, known as "supergrass," where
uncorroborated informer evidence was used to convict dozens of defendants).
219. See id. at 71 (stating thatjudge involved refused to admit that procedural rules
of evidence in quashed cases failed to guarantee right to fair trial).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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how the actions of judges do not protect defendants rights.223
Police arrested and charged Sam Baker, William Groves, and
Sean Valente with a highly-political and publicized killing in Feb-
ruary 1998.224 From the time of their arrest, advocates voiced
concerns regarding the existence of evidence and its quality-and
nature. 2 25 At the indictment hearing of Baker, Groves, and Va-
lente, a judge relied on a police officer's statement that the of-
ficer could connect the three defendants with the evidence in
the case.226 The judge failed to inquire into the nature of the
evidence and how this evidence specifically connected Baker,
Groves, and Valente with the crime.2 2 7 Lawyers have argued that
the judge violated the European Convention by failing to in-
quire thoroughly into the basis of Baker, Groves, and Valente's
continued retention.228 In August, the prosecutor dropped the
charges and released all three men, from what the Committee
on the Administration of Justice229 ("CAJ") notes is effectively
internment on demand based on questionable evidence. 23 ° This
case illustrates the difficulties related to miscarriages of justice
resulting from the trial courts, the Court, and the Home Of-
fice. 231 The CCRC is the British Government's response to such
difficulties.
212
II. CCRC AND RELEVANT COMMENTARY
The British government established the Commission follow-
223. Kara Irwin, Case by Case: Update on Baker, Groves, and Valente, JusT NEWS (Com-
mittee on Administration of Justice), Sept. 1998, at 5.
224. See id. (describing murder of loyalist Robert Dougan as part of series of kill-
ings following murder of loyalist Billy Right in prison in December 1997). Baker,
Groves, and Valente were charged with murder and as members of the IRA. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. CAJ Website (visited Sept. 15, 1998) <http://ourworld.compuserve.com/
homepages/CommAdminjustice> (on file with the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal). The CAJ is a non-governmental civil liberties organization based in Belfast and is
affiliated with the International Federation for Human Rights. Id.
230. See Irwin, supra note 223, at 5 (noting that this practice has occurred in
number of cases).
231. See WOFFINDEN, supra note 19, at 323 (stating that throughout current cen-
tury, appeal court judges have evaded responsibilities that Parliament prescribed for
them and that constituents have expected of them).
232. Paul Taylor, Is Justice Being Served by the Criminal Cases Review Commission?, LAW-
YER, Apr. 21, 1998, at 24.
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ing government and independent inquiries and investigations
into miscarriages of justice in the United Kingdom. 233  The
Criminal Appeal Act 1995234 ("1995 Act") gave the Commission
the mandate to consider applications of miscarriages of justice,
previously a role of the Home Office. 235 The new Commission's
mandate affords the Commission powers that are broader than
the previous powers of the Home Office, 2 6 but commentators
expressed concern over the Commission's effectiveness since its
initial proposal.
237
A. Background to the Establishment of the Commission
The British government established the Commission as the
result of the May Inquiry23 8 and other pressures. 23 '9 The May In-
quiry investigated the Maguire case2 4 ° and the Guildford and
Woolwich bombings.241 The May report criticized the Home Of-
233. Malleson, supra note 131, at 929; PATTENDEN, supra note 30, at 347.
234. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, ch. 35, § 8(1) (Eng.).
235. Id.
236. See Paul Donovan, Still No Answer to Riddle of Appeal, INDEPENDENT, Oct. 15,
1997, at C1 (describing Commission's expanded role in investigating, accessing docu-
ments, and acquiring previously undisclosed materials).
237. Taylor, supra note 232, at 24.
238. Malleson, supra note 131, at 929; Rachel Donnelly, Supporters Angry as Mc-
Namee Appeal Delayed, Irish Times on the Web (Nov. 12, 1998) (visited Nov. 13, 1998)
<http://www.irish-times.com/irish-times/paper/1998/1112/hom28.html> (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal); see PATTENDEN, supra note 30, at 353 (explaining
that May Inquiry was set up by SirJohn May in order to investigate case against Maguire
family). When Sir John's interim report was published, the Home Secretary referred
the case to the Criminal Court of Appeal where the convictions were quashed. Id.
239. PATTENDEN supra note 30, at 347. In 1981-82, the Home Affairs Committee
conducted a limited inquiry on how the Home Office conducted investigations into
alleged miscarriages ofjustice and reported concerns regarding the lack of independ-
ent scrutiny in handling these cases. Id. Nearly ten years later, the Home Affairs Com-
mittee recommended that the government carefully study whether the CPS, the prose-
cuting authorities in England and Wales, needed an external monitor to look at how
the CPS conducted individual cases. CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, FOURTH REPORT OF
THE HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HOUSE OF COMMONS (1989-90). Justice, a branch of the
International Commission ofJurists, produced a report in July 1989 entitled Miscarriages
ofJustice. PATTENDEN, supra note 30, at 346-47.
240. PATTENDEN, supra note 30, at 352-53. The Maguire case involved seven mem-
bers of the Maguire family, the youngest 14 years of age, who were all convicted based
on positive results obtained from hand-swab tests to determine the presence of the
bomb substance, nitroglycerine. Id. The investigation never uncovered even traces of
the substance in their home, which the prosecution claimed was a bomb-making fac-
tory. Id.
241. Id. at 347. The Guildford Four were four men who in 1975 were sentenced to
life imprisonment for bombing public houses in Guildford and Woolwich in England.
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fice24 2 for not being proactive enough in the cases that the
Home Office received for review.243 The RCCJ conducted an ad-
ditional inquiry following the release of the Birmingham Six. 244
The RCCJ and the law reform and human rights organization,
Justice,245 recommended the establishment of a new independ-
ent review body to replace the Home Office in its role reviewing
cases for miscarriages of justice.246  This recommendation re-
ceived significant support and led to the proposed Criminal
Cases Review Authority.247 This proposal resulted in the Com-
mission, which was established under the 1995 Act.2 4 8
The RCCJ claimed that the approach that successive Home
Secretaries had taken regarding the reference of cases led to the
change. 249 The RCCJ realized that the Home Office only consid-
ered and investigated cases that contained some form of new evi-
dence.25 ° Additionally, all of the sixteen members of C3, the di-
vision of the Home Office responsible for considering miscar-
riages of justice, lacked professional legal qualification.251 C3
considered, yet failed to correct, several of the worst miscarriage
of justice cases.252 For example, in the Maguire case,253 the
Home Office made a conscious decision not to investigate the
Id. Although their first appeal had been initiated when another group confessed to the
crime, it was not successful. Id. Their second appeal, 12 years later, was successful, and
they were released. Id. It was determined that evidence that finally led to their release
had been in the files of the Guildford police station, idle for fifteen years. Id.
242. Id. at 345-48. The Home Office gained the responsibility of detecting wrong-
ful convictions when the appeal courts have failed in England and Wales. Id.
243. Malleson, supra note 131, at 929.
244. Donnelly, supra note 238, at T17.
245. Dyer, supra note 117.
246. Malleson, supra note 131, at 929.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See id. (noting that Sir John May believed that home secretaries had taken
reactive, rather than proactive approach in handling cases).
250. See id. (stating that RCCJ received commentary that stated that Home Office
only considered cases with new evidence as Home Office did not have commitment or
resources to act otherwise).
251. See SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 67, at 95 (stating that none of members of C3
were trained as lawyers).
252. Id.
253. Patrick O'Connor, Prosecution Disclosure: Principle, Practice, and Justice, in Jus-
TICE IN ERROR, supra note 24, at 105. The prosecution failed to disclose the scientific
reports after the defense had requested them over a nine month period preceding the
trial. Id. The defense also did not know that another test, of which the prosecution was
aware, had found negative results for nitroglycerine on each of the swabs. Id.
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case because the Home Office believed that it was not the gov-
ernment's responsibility. 254 Scholars believe that the Home Of-
fice made this decision either because of a lack of commitment
to this role, to act otherwise, or because of a lack of resources. 255
The Home Office saw its position as an executive power in con-
flict with the role of reviewing and referring cases.2 56 Others
countered that the proposal of the Commission was the direct
reaction to a series of high-profile miscarriage ofjustice cases. 257
In either case, authors believe that the RCCJ proposed a body
with greater resources and independence, which the 1995 Act
reflects.
258
B. Establishment of the Commission
The 1995 Act established the Commission 259 and abolished
the power of the Home Secretary to refer cases to the Court.2 60
The Home Secretary previously could only refer cases resulting
in convictions. 261' The Commission, however, can refer cases in-
volving convictions and sentences.2 6 2 The Commission also pos-
sesses greater power to investigating possible miscarriages ofjus-
tice.263 In addition, the Commission has greater access to infor-
mation and documents from the police, the government, and
254. See PATFENDEN, supra note 30, at 353 (stating that it is not government's role
to uncover new evidence and that is the reason for not having scientist's committee
attempt as that would be what they attempted to do).
255. Malleson, supra note 131, at 929.
256. Id.; see Clarke, supra note 83, at 946 (citing RCCJ report that role assigned to
Home Office, of reviewing cases, was not compatible with constitutional separation of
powers that exists between courts and executive). The Home Office has the difficulty
of "being saddled with incompatible duties, invigilating a system whose integrity it must
protect." WOFFINDEN, supra note 19, at 334.
257. Taylor, supra note 232, at 24-25.
258. Malleson, supra note 131, at 929-30.
259. See Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, § 8(1) (Eng.) ("There shall be a body corpo-
rate to be known as the Criminal Cases Review Commission.")
260. Taylor, supra 232, at 24; see Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, ch. 35, § 3 (abolishing
power of Secretary of State to refer cases). The Home Secretary can still pardon con-
vicfed persons by exercising the Royal Prerogative of Mercy. PATrENDEN, supra note 30,
at 420.
261. Taylor, supra note 232, at 24.
262. See Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, § 9(1)(a) (stating that Commission "may...
refer the conviction to the Court of Appeal"); see also id. § 9(1) (b) (stating that Com-
mission "may... refer to the Court of Appeal any sentence"); Taylor, supra note 232, at
24-25 (stating that Commission has wider powers than Home Secretary).
263. Taylor, supra note 232, at 24-25.
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the prosecution. 264  The Commission may order the police to
produce all material in a case, including undisclosed material. 265
Authors believe that these powers may prove helpful in deter-
mining whether the police are abusing their discretion.26 6 The
Commission, however, cannot obtain documents that govern-
ment departments have created in the process of the Home Sec-
retary's consideration of the case.2 67
1. Powers and Responsibilities
The Commission is a non-departmental public body.268 The
1995 Act gives the Commission the responsibility of reviewing
cases for miscarriages of justice and referring back to the appro-
priate Court of Appeal269 any case that has a real possibility of
not being upheld.270 The Commission also investigates and re-
ports back to the Court any matter that the Court asks the Com-
mission to consider.271 Additionally, the 1995 Act afforded the
CCRC the power both to consider whether or not the Queen
264. Donovan, supra note 236, at Cl.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See PATTENDEN, supra note 30, at 418 (stating that documents produced in
Home Office's investigation do not have to be produced and that those documents that
do have to be produced may not be disclosed by CCRC without consent).
268. CCRC Ann. Rep., supra note 34, at 8; see PATrENDEN, supra note 30, at 418
(stating that Home Secretary will not play any role in day-to-day operation, but CCRC
will create annual report, which Home Secretary will present to Parliament).
269. See John Jackson, Trial Procedures, in JUSTICE IN ERROR, supra note 24, at 132
(explaining how British justice system uses magistrate judges, without juries, to handle
summary cases and how what is defined as summary case has expanded significantly
over recent years so that availability of defendants to elect for jury trial is limited).
Jackson believes that as more serious crimes are classified as summary, it becomes of
greater importance that the defendants receive a fair trial. Id. He also notes that there
are concerns about the secrecy shrouding the selection of magistrates, their indepen-
dence and impartiality, and their tendency to accept easily police evidence. Id. Many
of those pleading not guilty, prefer to have their case with ajury, which is in the Crown
Court, as they feel they are more likely to be acquitted. Id. Additionally, almost all
Crown Court cases receive legal aid. Id. The selection of jurors, however, is not as
random as it could be, and recent decisions by the government have given the prosecu-
tion more power in the jury selection process and the defense less. Id.
270. See Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, ch. 35, § 13(1) (a) (Eng.) (stating that convic-
tion, verdict, or sentence should not be sent back to Court of Appeal unless "there is a
real possibility that the conviction, verdict, or sentence would not be upheld were the
reference to be made").
271. See Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, § 15(1) (stating that where direction is given
by Court, Commission shall investigate specific matter).
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should exercise her power of mercy and to report such decisions
to the Secretary of State. 2 7 2
2. Structure
According to the 1995 Act, the Commission consists of thir-
teen commissioners, a chairman, a chief executive officer, a few
dozen caseworkers, and a secretarial and administrative staff.2 73
The Queen, according to the recommendations of the Prime
Minister, appoints the commissioners274 following specific staff-
ing criteria.271 In accordance with the 1995 Act, one-third of the
commissioners must be lawyers276 and two-thirds must have
knowledge or experience of some aspect of the criminal justice
system according to the Prime Minister.277 The 1995 Act also
requires that at least one member appears to the Prime Minister
to have some knowledge of some aspect of the criminal justice
system in Northern Ireland. 27' The 1995 Act formally estab-
lished the CCRC on January 1, 1997, and the CCRC began its
review of cases on March 31, 1997.279 On March 31, it received
284 cases transferred from the Home Office and the Northern
Ireland Office. 28 0 Within a year, nearly 135021 individuals ap-
plied, and by August 1998, the number of applicants exceeded
1800.282
272. See id. § 16 (mandating Commission to consider cases on whether Her Maj-
esty should exercise her prerogative of mercy and to refer conclusions on issue to Secre-
tary of State).
273. See id. § 8(3) (stating that Commission must have at least eleven members).
274. Id. § 8(4).'
275. Malleson, supra note 131, at 930.
276. See Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, § 8(5)(a-c) (Eng.). At least one-third of the
members of the Commission must be persons who are legally qualified, and for this
purpose a person is legally qualified if he has a ten year general qualification, within the
meaning of section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, or he is a member of
the Bar of Northern Ireland, or solicitor of the Supreme Court of Northern Ireland, of
at least ten years' standing. Id.
277. See id. § 8(6) (stating that criteria for having knowledge or experience of any
aspect of criminal justice system, particularly investigation of offenses and treatment of
offenders, is based on how candidates appear to Prime Minister).
278. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, § 8(6).
279. CCRC Ann. Rep., supra note 34, at 5.
280. Taylor, supra note 232, at 25.
281. Id.
282. See Campbell, supra note 40, at 17 (noting further that as of August, 1998, 20
cases have been referred back to Court, 61 cases were turned down by Commission, and
over 1000 wait for review).
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3. Procedural Aspects
When a trial court convicts a defendant of a criminal of-
fense, the defendant may appeal a conviction or sentence to the
Court.2 83 The Court can grant only one appeal, even if there is
an application for another appeal showing new evidence that
points to a defendant's innocence. 284 Once all of the appeals
processes are exhausted, the Commission may consider a case,
and new evidence not presented at the original trial or at the
appeal must exist.2 5 This new evidence may include evidence
that was unavailable or undisclosed to the defense earlier.28 6
Under exceptional circumstances, 287 a case can be referred back
without new evidence. 28  Once a case qualifies for considera-
tion, a caseworker will examine and investigate it.289 The
caseworker may conduct original research or interview the appli-
cant and any possible witnesses.2 9 ° If the caseworker believes
that there is a strong possibility of a miscarriage, then the case
notes are forwarded to three of the thirteen commissioners
291
who decide whether to refer the case back to the Court.2 9 2
C. Effectiveness of CCRC
As noted by the Commission, 293 the effectiveness of the
283. PATTENDEN, supra note 30, at 348.
284. See id. (explaining how British system is contrary to practice of most countries
in continental Europe where an appellate court can re-open case at any time).
285. See Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, § 13(1) (a) (b) (i) (Eng.) (stating that reference
to Court of Appeal shall not be made unless there is "an argument or evidence, not
raised in the proceedings which led to it or on any appeal or application for leave of
appeal against it").
286. See Campbell, supra note 40, at 17 (noting that defendants who lack new evi-
dence but are in fact innocent may not be eligible to be considered by CCRC).
287. See Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, § 13(2) (using language of "exceptional cir-
cumstances which justify making" reference).
288. See Donovan, supra note 236, at Cl (assuming that "exceptional circum-
stances" language would allow possibility of less rigid standard).
289. See CCRC Ann. Rep., supra note 34, at 22 (explaining case review process,
which separates procedure into three stages).
290. See Criminal Appeals Act, 1995, § 19 (allowing Commission to appoint investi-
gating officers); see also Campbell, supra note 40, at 17 (stating that applicants may be
interviewed and almost half of applicants are in prison).
291. Campbell, supra note 40.
292. See CCRC Ann. Rep., supra note 34, at 22 (stating that caseworker provides
overview of case to committee of at least three Commission Members, who then make
"case decision" whether to refer case back to Court of Appeal); Paul Donovan, Cold
Comfort for Victims of Injustice, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 7, 1996, at 20.
293. See CCRC Ann. Rep., supra note 34, at 5 (discussing how before establishment
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CCRC has been in question since the concept of the CCRC was
first introduced.294 The concern involves current challenges and
is rooted in a history of criticism of independent bodies295 and
the criminal justice system. 296 The wariness of the Commission
ranges from the body's limited power 29 7 and the appointment of
its commissioners, 2 98 to the language of the mandate, 299 legal
aid,3°° and expected delays. °1
1. The CCRC's Role in England and Wales and in
Northern Ireland
The United Kingdom has appointed independent bodies to
investigate a variety of circumstances. °2 Human rights groups
complain that a related body, the Independent Commission for
Police Complaints30 3 ("ICPC"), has been particularly unsuccess-
ful in its independent role.30 4 The government established the
of CCRC concerns were expressed regarding its independence and ability to investigate
thoroughly); see also id. at 7 (acknowledging concerns expressed by commentators when
CCRC was being established).
294. See Taylor, supra note 232, at 24 (noting that commentators expressed con-
cern over proposed set-up and on whether Commission will be able to function any
more effectively than Home Secretaries).
295. See LAWYERS COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 85-91 (describing
ineffectiveness of complaints procedures in Northern Ireland for abuses against de-
fense attorneys).
296. See WOFFINDEN, supra note 19, at xi (stating that United Kingdom is compla-
cent in recognizing faults with its judicial system, even though mechanisms exist to
detect and correct errors).
297. Robinson, supra note 42.
298. Id.
299. J.C. Smith, Criminal Appeals and the CCRC - Part 2, 145 NEW L.J. 572, 573
(1995) (suggesting that language of act needs further explanation as it is currently
vague).
300. Campbell, supra note 40, at 17.
301. CCRC Ann. Rep., supra note 34, at 7.
302. See LAwVEos COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 87-88 (describing
independent investigative role of Independent Commission for Police Complaints
("ICPC") and of coroners in inquests); see also LAwYEs COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RiGHTS,
supra note 22, at 21-29 (chronicling series of independent reviews of emergency legisla-
tion, which authors criticize, particularly for ignoring international obligations that
emergency legislation violates).
303. Id. The ICPC was established by the Police (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 in
1988 to be an independent observer of investigations of complaints against the RUC,
the police force in Northern Ireland. U.S. Embassy, supra note 28.
304. LAwYERs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 87-88. The ICPC,
like the CCRC, has its commission members appointed by the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland, the equivalent to the British Home Secretary that appoints the CCRC
commissioners. Id. There is a requirement for the ICPC that half of its eight members
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ICPC to review complaints lodged against the police in Northern
Ireland.10 5 Similar to the CCRC, the police conduct ICPC inves-
tigations.3 °6 The police have not been effective in investigating
their own misconduct, and there have been very few prosecu-
tions stemming from these investigations. °7 The U.S. State De-
partment commented on this inadequacy when it stated that the
ICPC did not corroborate any of 840 claims of police miscon-
duct that it had received in the first two years of existence. 0
The CCRC has resources and power to conduct its own in-
vestigations, but still relies heavily on the police. 30 9 The CCRC
generally uses police officers from forces other than the one that
conducted the initial inquiry,310 but the CCRC has used police
from the same force in at least one case.311 In many of the major
miscarriages of justice cases, according to one author, the con-
duct of the police in dealing with the suspects has been called
into question. 12 The CCRC's annual report emphasizes that the
CCRC closely monitors these police investigations, 13 however,
the ICPC has exemplified that the role of supervising investiga-
tions may be a hollow one. 14
Under the existing system, critics are concerned as to how
independent a body can be.31 5 An initial attack on the Commis-
sion warns that police, who erred in the first place during the
are solicitors and one other needs to be legally trained. Id. They have a similar role in
choosing police investigators, in that the ICPC can reject the RUC's choice of officers to
investigate, but cannot actually choose them. Id.
305. LAWYRs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RiGHTS, supra note 2, at 87-88.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See id. at 8 (discussing undetermined U.S. Department of State report, which
criticized ICPC for failure to answer to complaints filed).
309. See CCRC Ann. Rep., supra note 34, at 22 (discussing use of police in investi-
gations).
310. See Mansfield & Taylor, supra note 124, at 164-65. It is contended that police
forces should not be expected to reinvestigate their own misconduct, as they may actu-
ally interpret the evidence to protect themselves and to quash any notion of their own
misconduct. Id. Additionally, even police officers from other forces may act out of
fraternal solidarity within the police and may lessen the impact of new minds. Id. Po-
lice may also be reluctant to expose mistakes by other police in order to preserve the
public's confidence in the police force. SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 67, at 95.
311. CCRC Ann. Rep., supra note 34, at 22.
312. SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 67, at 93.
313. See CCRC Ann. Rep., supra note 34, at 22 (stating that CCRC also meets and
exchanges information with investigating officers during investigation).
314. LAwX'Rs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 8.
315. Taylor, supra note 232; see Donovan, supra note 292, at 20 (stating that contin-
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initial investigation, would investigate the body's cases.116 The
CCRC's limited power to send cases back to the Court, which
also already made a mistake, compounds this concern.317
2. Appointment, Makeup, and Use of Commissioners
The Queen appoints members of the Commission on the
recommendation of the Prime Minister.3 18 Authors argue that
this system may not be the most effective way to staff such a body,
as the current staffing procedure results in a connection with the
government that does not further the independence of the com-
mission. 9 Critics point out that the appointments are essen-
tially political in nature.3 2' Additionally, critics question the
qualifications of originally appointed commissioners. 21
Under the 1995 Act, one-third of the commissioners must
be trained lawyers, and two-thirds must have some experience in
the criminal justice system.3 2 2 In practical terms, if the 1995 Act
is interpreted loosely, which the Commission seems to have
done, then one-third of the Commission members do not have
to be lawyers or have any experience with any aspect of the crim-
inal justice system.323 Some scholars, in their early analysis of the
CCRC, viewed this mandate to mean that all of the commission-
ers would fall into one of the two groups, either a lawyer or one
ued use of police, to investigate police, is what many regard as the Achilles' heel of
police investigation).
316. See Taylor, supra note 232 (quoting another author describing CCRC as "a
toothless commission whose inquiries will be conducted by the police [who made mis-
takes that led to injustices] and whose only power is to refer a case to the Court of
Appeal [which made the mistake in the first place]").
317. Id.
318. See Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, § 8(4), (6) (Eng.) (stating that Her Majesty
appoints members of Commission following recommendation from Prime Minister and
that Prime Minister has discretion on choosing members who appear to be qualified).
319. See Leonard Jason-Lloyd, The Criminal Cases Review Commission-One Year On-
Part 2, 148 NEw L.J. 1244, 1244 (1998) (describing how number of commentators ex-
pressed concern over appointment process); see also Malleson, supra note 131, at 930
(stating that connection to government is not completely severed with this appointment
process).
320. SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 67, at 93.
321. Robinson, supra note 42.
322. Malleson, supra note 131, at 930; see Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, § 8 (5), (6)
(providing that "at least one-third of the members of the Commission shall be persons
who are legally qualified" and "two thirds of the members of the Commission shall be
persons who appear to the Prime Minister to have knowledge or experience of any
aspect of the criminal justice system").
323. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, § 8 (5), (6).
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with some exposure to the criminal justice system.32 4 Of the cur-
rent thirteen commissioners and one chairman, three appear
not to fall into either category.3 25 Moreover, only one of the
members, John Leckey, is from Northern Ireland.326 Although
trained to be a lawyer, Leckey has little miscarriage of justice ex-
perience and is a coroner by profession. 327 The fact that Leckey
is part of the establishment in a flawed system may also limit his
work with miscarriages of justice.3 2 Additionally, defense attor-
neys argue that the Commission's membership is weighted to-
wards the prosecuting authorities.329
Notable concern exists among critics with respect to the ap-
pointment of Sir Frederick Crawford as chairman and regarding
the advertisement of the position. 3 Sir Crawford's credentials
as a plasma scientist, who formerly worked with the National Aer-
onautics and Space Administration 331 ("NASA"), do not readily
fill the mandate for the CCRC personnel. 2 Authors contend
that Crawford's role, particularly because of its supervisory na-
324. See Malleson, supra note 131, at 930 (stating belief that all members will have
some experience).
325. See CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION, APPLICATION MATERIALS (1997)
(showing that Sir Frederick Crawford is engineer and past Master of Worshipful Com-
pany of Engineers). Crawford's criminal justice experience involved his role as High
Sheriff and Deputy Lieutenant in the West Midlands, which has a record involving mis-
carriage of justice cases recently. Id.; see Donovan, supra note 292 (stating Crawford's
main role has been as academic and his experience with miscarriages of justice is not
evident from this information); see supra (describing Tony Foster as chemist who has
been involved with manufacturing and business community). Mr. Weiss is Chartered
Accountant who has been involved with corporate finance, but there is no mention of
any relevant experience with the criminal justice system. Id.
326. Robinson, supra note 42; see Langdon-Down, supra note 125 (detailing speech
by Jane Winter of British Irish Rights Watch regarding concern that Commission is not
familiar enough with justice system in Northern Ireland); E-mail interview from Jane
Winter, Dec. 19, 1998 (on file with Fordham International Law Journal) (describing March
11, 1998 CCRC training session on criminal justice system in Northern Ireland held for
one afternoon).
327. Robinson, supra note 42.
328. Interview with Martin Flaherty, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law, in New York, New York (Dec. 2, 1998).
329. Michael Mansfield, Justicefor All, RED PEPPER: ARCHIVE (visited Sept. 15,1998)
<http://www.redpepper.org.uk/xmansfld.html> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
330. Donovan, supra note 292, at 20.
331. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Homepage (visited Mar. 30, 1999)
<http://www.nasa.gov/nqpao/welcome_letter.html> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal).
332. Donovan, supra note 292, at 20.
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ture, would seem to require that he had experience investigating
miscarriages ofjustice, but he does not.33 Jim Nichol, an exper-
ienced solicitor who has handled high-profile cases,3"4 stated
that Crawford has no record in the area of miscarriages of jus-
tice, and Nichol found no record of Crawford speaking out
against injustices anywhere.335 Additionally, Crawford is a mem-
ber of an elite branch of the Freemasons, a fraternal secret or-
ganization.336 Critics question whether a Mason should have a
role in the CCRC because the Masons have had a role in several
miscarriages of justice according to the Director of Liberty. 37
Critics also claim that the British government did not widely
publicize3 3 8 the part time, £88,000-a-year chairman position, as it
had promised.33 9 Also, some of the applicants who were rejected
seem to be more qualified than those chosen.340 For example,
Chris Price, who has a background in correcting miscarriages of
justice, received a rejection. 41 In the 197 0s, while a Member of
Parliament, he successfully cleared the name of Maxwell Comfait
by uncovering police corruption.342
The CCRC recognizes that as of its first annual report the
number of caseworkers needed to be increased. 43 Indeed,
within the first week of operation, Crawford stated that there was
a shortage of funding and staff to deal with the number of
cases.34 4 In spite of the fact that there does not appear to be any
333. Id.
334. See id. (stating that Jim Nichol was solicitor on Bridgewater Four case).
335. See id. (quoting Jim Nichol, who stated that Crawford "has no record in the
area of miscarriages of justice" and no record was found "of Crawford speaking out on
injustices anywhere").
336. Duncan Campbell & Malcolm Glynn, Justice Commission Chief Is Elite Mason,
GuARDiAN, Aug. 15, 1996, at 1.
337. Id. Liberty is non-governmental civil liberties organization. Donovan, supra
note 292, at 20.
338. Donovan, supra note 292, at 20.
339. See PAIrENDEN, supra note 30, at 418 (noting that government committed to
advertise all positions, including position of chairman).
340. See Donovan, supra note 292, at 20 (noting that Chris Price MP has had expe-
rience with miscarriage of justice cases and with exposing police corruption).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See CCRC Ann. Rep., supra note 34, at 5 (stating plans to increase number of
case managers from 24 to 50).
344. Justice Snowed Under, LEGAL NEWS (Apr. 15, 1997) (visited Sept. 15, 1998)
<http://www.gti.co.uk/law/lawnewsl504.htm> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
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particular staffing criteria for the caseworkers,345 they seem to
have a substantial amount of discretion in review and investiga-
tion. 3 4 6 A member of the House of Lords raised the issue in Par-
liament of whether case review managers should be trained, but
the topic did not receive significant discussion, citing the Com-
mission's discretion in appointing its own staff.
347
3. Limitations of the CCRC's Mandate
The CCRC only considers cases where there is new evi-
dence. 348 This means that the CCRC might not consider a case
where a defendant has been wrongly convicted but does not
have new evidence to show. 3 49 In some cases where applicants
presented new evidence to the Commission, the Commission
made a quick referral to the Court.3 50 But in a case where only a
possibility of new evidence exists following a future investigation,
it is unclear how dedicated the CCRC will be to the investigation,
and it is questionable as to whether it will investigate.3 51 As dis-
cussed earlier, the reluctance of the Home Office to investigate
triggered the creation of the CCRC.352
Some interest groups, including Justice, hope that the
CCRC conducts these investigations because these interest
groups and their clients do not have the resources to do so
themselves.35 3 Additionally, the CCRC has broader power in ob-
345. CCRC Ann. Rep., supra note 34 at 12; Criminal Cases Review Commission,
Management Statement for the Criminal Cases Review Commission (visited June 1, 1998)
<http://www.coi.gov.uk/coi/depts/GRC/coiO184e.ok> (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal).
346. CCRC Ann. Rep., supra note 34, at 22.
347. See Criminal Cases Review Commission: Case Review Managers, Hansard Debates
Before the House of Commons, British Parliament, June 29, 1998 (visited Oct. 22, 1998)
<http://www.parliament.the-staionery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199697/ldhansrd/pdvn/
alldays.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (stating that Lord Les-
ter of Herne Hill asked Her Majesty's Government whether they agree with CCRC posi-
tion that trained lawyers are not necessary when investigating suspected miscarriages of
justice). Lord Williams of Mostyn answered that under the Criminal Appeal Act of 1995
the CCRC has discretion in choosing employees, subject to approval from the Secretary
of State. Id. Additionally, he added that it would "not be appropriate for Her Majesty's
Government to comment on the Criminal Cases Review Commission's internal arrange-
ments concerning recruitment." Id.
348. Campbell, supra note 40, at 17.
349. Id.
350. Donovan, supra note 236, at C1.
351. Id.
352. Malleson, supra note 131, at 929; PA-1rENDEN, supra note 30, at 347.
353. Donovan, supra note 236, at C1.
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taining documents from the police than these groups.35 4 Critics
fear, however, that because of the Commission's limited re-
sources, the Commission will interpret its mandate narrowly and
only consider cases where there is already new evidence and no
need for any new investigation.355 In this regard, critics argue,
the Commission would be no different from its predecessor, the
Home Office.356
4. The Effectiveness of the Commission in Light of the Court
The overall effectiveness of the CCRC depends on the sub-
sequent actions of the appellate courts.3 57 One of the strongest
early criticisms of the CCRC concept was that it lacks the power
to decide cases for itself.358 The CCRC only mantains the power
to refer cases back to the Court, thus the appellate courts have
the final word on whether or not miscarriages of justice will be
corrected.3 5 9 The Commission does not have the ability to act
itself, by overturning or quashing a conviction, or altering a sen-
tence. 6 ° Under the CCRC mandate, one of the elements in con-
sidering whether to refer back a case is the likelihood that the
appellate court will quash it.361 Even if the CCRC is structurally
independent, it will depend on the approach of the Court be-
cause the Court is the sole body that can alter a verdict.36 2
One author believes that the CCRC has the potential to al-
ter that relationship in light of positive feedback from some
members of the bench.363 This author realizes, however, that
even if the relationship is amiable between the Court and the
Commission, the 1995 Act mandates the Court to treat a referral
from the Commission as an ordinary appeal.3 64 Two authors ar-
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.; see Malleson, supra note 131, at 933 (stating that applicants to Home Sec-
retary sometimes found themselves in predicament where Home Secretary would not
investigate unless there was new evidence, but new evidence would not be found until
investigation was initiated).
357. Malleson, supra note 131, at 929.
358. Id. at 926.
359. Clarke, supra note 83.
360. Id.
361. Malleson, supra note 131, at 929, 934.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. See id. (noting that Court has not "acted as a rubber stamp" in past and is
unlikely to do so in future).
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gue that there is no evidence to assert that the new Commission
will alter the practices of the Court, particularly in light of the
fact that the animosity that existed between the Home Office
and the Court may develop between the CCRC and the Court
because the reasons for this animosity may still be present.3 65
5. Unlikelihood of Changing the System
Some believe that the CCRC will positively effect the overall
functioning of the criminal justice system. 36 6 Under the 1995
Act, however, there is nothing to ensure that the work of the
CCRC will have any effect on the courts or the criminal justice
system. 67 In particular, the Court is supposed to deal with refer-
ences from the CCRC with the same scrutiny and deference as
any other appeal, using general appellate principles. 68 To the
contrary, the CCRC expects to gain knowledge on its own per-
formance by considering the reaction to the cases that it has re-
ferred back to the Court.369
Logically, if the criminal justice system operated effectively,
then there would be no need for the CCRC.17 ' The effectiveness
of the criminal justice system at lower levels would save money3 71
365. David Schiff & Richard Nobles, Criminal Appeal Act of 1995: The Semantics of
Jurisdiction, 59 MOD. L. REv. 573 (1996).
366. See Donnelly, supra note 238 (quoting Kevin McNamara MP, speaking of re-
cent delay of Danny McNamee case that was sent back to Court by CCRC). "There is
also an historical significance about this trial because we hope it brings to an end an era
of judgments in the British Courts leading to gross miscarriages of justice." Id.
367. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, ch. 35 (Eng.).
368. Malleson, supra note 131, at 934.
369. CCRC Ann. Rep., supra note 34, at 7.
370. See BBC News, One Thousand Innocent Prisoners, Says Former Governor, Aug. 10,
1998 (visited Oct. 22, 1998) <http://bbcnews.org/low/english/uk/newsid_76000/
76830.stm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (stating view of Dr.
David Wilson that CCRC exists because government knows that there are innocent pris-
oners).
371. See CCRC Ann, Rep., supra note 34, at 38-48 (illustrating how saving money
does seem to be of concern considering financial sophistication of CCRC annual report
and questions in parliament). Lord Avebury questioned: "If the number of convictions
overturned by the Criminal Cases Review Commission continued to be the same pro-
portion as at present, how much public money would be saved through the release of
those wrongfully imprisoned." Parliament, Hansard Written Answers, Criminal Cases Re-
view Commission, May 19, 1998 (visited Oct. 22, 1998) <http://www.parliament.the-sta-
tionery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199697/ldhansrd/pdvn/allddays.htm> (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal). Lord Mostyn answered: "Such a calculation would re-
quire too many assumptions to make it useful. The importance of correcting
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and better preserve justice. 2 Currently, however, there is a
need for the CCRC to handle cases with which the system has
not adequately dealt.3 73 A former prison governor and current
academic recently told the British Broadcasting Company
("BBC") that the existence of the CCRC amounts to an admis-
sion by the system that it convicted some prisoners wrongly. 74
The 1995 Act includes a recommendation made by the RCCJ to
amend the Criminal Appeals Act to include what the RCCJ refers
to as a broader scope for finding justice.3 7  The 1995 Act pro-
poses to do so by expanding the rules of admissibility of evi-
dence.3 7 6 The RCCJ recommended that the phrase "likely to be
credible" be replaced with "capable of belief. '3 77 The RCCJ be-
lieves "capable of belief' is a broader definition, under which
more evidence will be admissible.37 8 The British government's
Discussion Paper3 79 ("Paper"), however, does not reflect the con-
tent of this recommendation in the same way.380 The Paper re-
fers to the amendment as the current operating method of the
Court, not as an attempt to change it. 81
History further evidences the unlikelihood of change in the
Court.3 18 2 According to one author, the 1995 Act will probably
not have much of an effect on the Court's practices because such
efforts for change in the past through Parliamentary statute have
been extremely difficult.38 3 Additionally, this Parliamentary stat-
ute did not contain language that expressed a clear intent to
miscarriages of justice does not in any way depend on any consequential savings to
public funds." Id.
372. BBC News, supra note 370.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. See Malleson, supra note 131, at 929, 935 (stating that Government Discussion
Paper said that 1995 Act reflected how Court was already operating).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. See Smith, supra note 299, at 573 (describing Government Discussion Paper as
document of government in power that contains proposals for legislation).
380. Malleson, supra note 131, at 935.
381. Id.
382. See id. (quoting Lord Devlin, from history, who stated "Parliament can as we
know, do anything it likes, but it has not yet found a way of suggesting to the judges in
statutory language that they should be less sticky about the use of its powers").
383. Id.
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change the Court, so it is even less likely to have any effect on
the Court's approach."8 4
6. Vague Language in the Mandate and Evidentiary Concerns
Critics argue that currently the language of the 1995 Act is
ambiguous.3" 5 The 1995 Act does not say anything about what
criteria the CCRC should consider when determining whether
the finding in a case is unsafe. 8 6 The CCRC itself hopes to gain
insight into what is meant by phrases such as "exceptional cir-
cumstances," "capable of belief," "real possibility," and "un-
safe."38 7 The Commission currently does not consider the inno-
cence of the defendant along with the way that the case had
been conducted,3 88 even though some authors believe that it
should.38 9 Those who think the Commission is necessary, be-
lieve that the Commission must consider whether the defendant
actually committed the crime. 9 °
Under the current rules of evidence, there may be some
materials that the CCRC uses to consider cases that are not ad-
missible in the Court 9.3 1 Therefore, although this information
might be useful, and even necessary, to persuade the Court of a
defendant's innocence and may have already persuaded the
CCRC, it is simply not admissible and cannot be used to consider
384. Id.
385. See Taylor, supra note 232, at 24-25 (stating that terms of Criminal Appeal Act
are ambiguous and that parliamentary debates did little to clarify meanings).
386. See Smith, supra note 299, at 572 (suggesting that mandate of Commission be
further explained, by addition of following provision: "a conviction is unsafe where, in
the light of representations made to the court, of any fresh evidence, and of all the
circumstances, it is not satisfied (i) that the appellant is guilty of the offence; or (ii) that
a reasonable jury would have convicted the appellant if the trial had been properly
conducted in all respects.").
387. See CCRC Ann. Rep., supra note 34, at 7 (discussing development of meanings
of terms used to consider cases, Commission states that in coming year, Commission
will gain valuable insight into practical interpretation of terms in 1995 Act, including
"exceptional circumstances," "capable of belief," "real possibility," and "unsafe," which
affect case review, particularly as its case referrals are heard by courts of appeal).
388. See Taylor, supra note 232, at 24-25 (describing clarifying discussion author
had with CCRC, where it was determined that safeness of conviction is in issue, not
innocence of applicant).
389. See Smith, supra note 299, at 573 (stating that 1995 Act says nothing about
referring cases where there is real doubt whether defendant committed crime, but au-
thor assumes that Commission must consider issue of defendant's innocence).
390. Id.
391. Id.
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the "safeness" of the case.392 Under this system, authors believe
that it is pointless even to refer back a case to the Court if the
decision of the CCRC to refer the case is based solely on inad-
missible evidence. 93
7. Challenges in the Existing Criminal Justice System
The new Commission has not cured a myriad of problems
in the system that have been instrumental in causing some mis-
carriages in the first place.394 Rather, these challenges will limit
the successfulness of the body.395 These challenges include con-
cerns of legal aid, 96 delays,397 and disclosure.398
The Commission' addressed concerns regarding legal aid di-
rectly in their application materials.399 The CCRC included a
page that describes the use of a lawyer and how one may apply
for legal aid.400 Some critics believe that legal aid is crucial to
the success of the CCRC.401 One author believes that in order to
have success, applicants need a committed lawyer, supportive
family and friends, or good luck.4" 2 The CCRC itself states that
although it is not necessary to have a lawyer, the process may be
quicker with a lawyer's assistance.40 3 Current CCRC figures show
that only one in ten CCRC applicants has legal representation.40 4
392. See id. at 573-74 (stating that ideally no evidence that might render conviction
unsafe would be excluded from trial, but currently that is not within rules of evidence).
393. See id. at 574 (stating that even though inadmissible evidence may show case
to be unsafe, there is no point in referring case to Court because Court must follow
rules of evidence).
394. See id. at 573 (describing how rules of evidence may prevent relevant material
from being admitted); see also Campbell, supra note 40 (citing lack of legal aid, poten-
tial delays, and issues of disclosure continuing).
395. Campbell, supra note 40, at 17.
396. CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION, APPLICATION MATERIALS, LEGAL AID
SCHEME DOCUMENTATION (1997).
397. Campbell, supra note 40, at 17.
398. Clarke, supra note 83, at 946.
399. CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 396.
400. CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION, APPLICATION MATERIALS, PAYING A SOLICI-
TOR TO HELP WITH YOUR APPLICATION (1997).
401. See Campbell, supra note 40, at 17 (noting that good lawyers do exist, but only
one in ten applicants to Commission are legally represented).
402. Id.
403. See CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 400 (stating that applicant
does not have to use solicitor when applying to Commission, but having one may help
Commission get to point of making decision more quickly).
404. Campbell, supra note 40, at 170.
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Many of these applicants claim that they did not have adequate
representation at trial.40 5
The ordinary legal aid application scheme generally allows
two hours of legal aid.4 ° 6 The CCRC form says that more time
can be allowed to cover an application to the Commission,0 7 but
according to one author it is difficult to receive additional
time.408 Also, the legal aid scheme will not be in effect while the
Commission carries out its investigation. 40 9 The lack of legal aid
coverage may even increase costs to the Commission, as the
Commission's work might be made easier if the commissioners
and caseworkers could speak directly with lawyers, rather than
the individual applicants. 410 The only solution to this dilemma is
to find a lawyer willing to work for free.411
Despite the Royal Commission report and the Hickey case
holding, the 1995 Act still leaves the disclosure rules uncer-
tain.412 Nothing in the 1995 Act speaks of disclosure of materials
to the applicant.413 Disclosure seems to be a detrimental omis-
sion from the 1995 Act as one of the most significant functions
of the Commission will be to uncover undisclosed material cur-
rently under the prosecution's control.4 14 There are strict rules
about disclosure at trial and appeal, but once the appeals are
exhausted these rules do not apply.415 The CCRC will be at-
tempting to find previously-undisclosed information, particularly
from the prosecution.41 6
Lawyers familiar with submitting miscarriage ofjustice appli-
405. Id.
406. See Clarke, supra note 83, at 948 (noting that Commission may actually be
saved money by greater legal aid, as Commission's job would be easier if they could
work directly with lawyers).
407. CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 400.
408. See Clarke, supra note 83, at 948 (stating that it is unclear whether Commis-
sion can contract lawyers to represent applicants within Commission's budget).
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, ch. 35, §§ 17-18 (Eng.); see Clarke, supra note 83,
at 948 (stating that 1995 Act gives Commission power to require production of docu-
ments from public bodies, but does not address issue of disclosure of information to
applicant).
413. Clarke, supra note 83, at 947.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. See id. (stating that not solving issue of disclosure is "major ommission from
the Act").
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cations have noted that delays were a trademark of the Home
Office and the Northern Ireland Office.417 With the daily addi-
tion of four to five cases4 8 and greater investigative power, the
Commission realizes that it needs more Case Review Managers to
handle the load to prevent further delays.4 19 One author partic-
ularly notes that the coexistence of the CCRC and the Criminal
Procedure and Investigation Act of 1996420 poses a potential
problem.4 21 Certain materials, specifically under the code of
practice relating to retention of materials by the police, could be
destroyed by police when the CCRC decides not to refer a case
back to the courts.4 2 2 According to this author, this material
would then be unavailable in the event that new forensic tests
and techniques were developed that would cause the case to be
reconsidered.4 23
III. THE CCRC AND NORTHERN IRELAND
The situation in Northern Ireland presents unique chal-
lenges to the CCRC. It is unclear whether the commissioners
and caseworkers are currently equipped to deal effectively with
these distinctions.4 24 Lawyers and NGOs, particularly concern-
ing cases heard before Diplock Courts, have raised concerns.42 5
The Commission did participate in some training regarding the
Northern Ireland cases, but such training lasted only a few
hours.4 26 Additionally, academics taught the course, rather than
practitioners.427 The meeting took place after lawyers from
417. See Langdon-Down, supra note 125, at 23 (quoting Razia Karim, legal officer
for Justice, who stated that once cases were sent to Home Office, it might take years
before hearing decision).
418. CCRC Ann. Rep., supra note 34, at 5.
419. Id. at 7.
420. Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act, 1996 (Eng.).
421. See Robinson, supra note 42.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. See supra note 326 and accompanying text (noting only one Commissioner is
from Northern Ireland and detailing Jane Winter of British Irish Rights Watch's speech
regarding concern that Commission is not familiar enough with justice system in North-
ern Ireland).
425. Id.; see Flaherty, supra note 162, at 96 (defining Diplock Courts as courts in
which certain offenses, which are mostly, but not entirely related to political violence,
are tried in absence of a jury in front of one judge).
426. See supra note 326 and accompanying text (describing e-mail from Jane Win-
ter regarding March 11, 1998 CCRC training session held for one afternoon).
427. Id.
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Northern Ireland and NGOs urged the CCRC to do so.428 The
session did not focus on the elements of the Northern Irish sys-
tem likely to create miscarriages of justice, but rather presented
a straightforward description of the ways that the Northern Ire-
land justice system is different.4 29
A. Emergency Legislation
The emergency legislation of Northern Ireland stands in
striking contrast to the ordinary criminal standards applied in
Britain and Northern Ireland. To consider the situation in
Northern Ireland as one with only minor differences from a non-
emergency situation is incorrect.43 ° Police can stop, question,
and search persons without approval from a judge.4 3" ' Once ar-
rested, the defendant can be held for prolonged periods of time
and be subjected to intense interrogation.432 The confessions
that may result from the interrogations and extended detentions
are then used to convict the individual.4 33 This emergency legis-
lation is more broadly used than elsewhere in the United King-
dom, and its effects have also infected the ordinary law of North-
ern Ireland. 4 Some NGOs fear that the CCRC is not suffi-
ciently aware of this distinction4 35 and will not thoroughly
consider the effects of this legislation on cases from Northern
Ireland.
B. Role ofJudges Under Emergency Legislation
The role of judges demands even greater attention when
the judges operate under a jury-less system as in the Diplock
Courts of Northern Ireland.436 As discussed earlier, human
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (stating that emergency element of
legislation has become part of ordinary functioning of system in Northern Ireland).
431. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (describing powers that police have
regarding search and seizure under EPAs).
432. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing seven-day detention
without charge under EPA).
433. Supra note 170 and accompanying text.
434. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (contending that emergency legis-
lation has greater effect in Northern Ireland than in England and Wales).
435. See supra note 326 and accompanying text (noting Jane Winter's concern re-
garding Commission's lack of familiarity with Northern Ireland's system).
436. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (noting need forjudges to consider
divided nature of society, in light of nonjury trials).
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rights organizations believe that members of the judiciary are
not sufficiently aware of their obligation to protect the rights of
defendants, especially when legislation has encroached upon
many basic rights.437 This particular criticism is relevant follow-
ing a series of previous cases that courts eventually quashed, in-
volving the admission of uncorroborated evidence.' Addition-
ally, the notion that judges become case hardened is an issue
that the CCRC should address carefully. The theory is that be-
cause judges rely on confessions so frequently and lay witnesses
rarely testify in these cases, the judiciary may too easily accept
the testimony of the police and security forces.4 9 The recent
case of Baker, Groves, and Valente illustrates a recent mistaken
judgment by a judge in the Northern Irish system.44
C. Other Challenges Relating to the Criminal Justice System in
Northern Ireland
The elimination of the right to silence is an infringement
on the rights of the accused and is of particular concern in
Northern Ireland.44 t Where a substantial number of the popula-
tion distrusts the police, it is dangerous to assume that the peo-
ple's silence is based on guilt rather than on fear, mistrust, or
the civil decision not to cooperate.442 This assumption is further
discredited by the coexistence of the elimination of the right to
silence and coercive interrogations permitted under the emer-
gency legislation.443 The CCRC needs to be aware that miscar-
riages of justice in Northern Ireland do in fact exist. Therefore,
it is imperative that when the CCRC is reviewing cases from
437. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (describing how individual judges
believe that they know better than European Commission on Human Rights).
438. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing practice of convicting
based on informer evidence, which is no longer used).
439. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text (describing how the routine
admission and reliance on confessions may lead to lower standard of admissibility, espe-
cially in regard to confession evidence).
440. See supra notes 223-30 and accompanying text (explaining howjudge failed to
protect defendants' rights by not inquiring into nature of police evidence that con-
nected defendants with crime).
441. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text (considering right to silence
limitations in non-jury trials as intensifying concern over right to silence).
442. See supra note 179 (stating that fear and civil non-cooperation may be reasons
for remaining silent, rather than guilt).
443. See supra note 179, 191 (stating that silence is as likely to be caused by fear or
civil non-cooperation as guilt in Northern Ireland situation).
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Northern Ireland, it is aware of EPAs and their effects on the
whole system of justice in Northern Ireland.
CONCLUSION
Many organizations see the CCRC as a definite improve-
ment over the Home Office and the Northern Ireland Office.
They generally, however, do so with a certain level of reservation.
The CAJ, an NGO, stated that although it is too early to come to
a final judgment on the Commission, its operations over the first
year appear encouraging.
The CCRC, however, has several structural challenges and is
faced with problems from the existing criminal justice system.
These challenges are further exacerbated by the situation in
Northern Ireland and its emergency legislation. The Commis-
sion does, however, have certain powers that the Home Office
and the Northern Ireland Office did not have. How the CCRC
decides to use these powers will be the true test. Additionally,
because the Court has the final say, the Court's reaction to the
CCRC will determine whether miscarriges will be corrected.
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